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ABSTRACT
Epidemic models are commonly used to model the propagation of malicious 
mobile code like a computer virus or a worm. In this dissertation, we introduce stochastic 
techniques to describe the propagation behavior of malicious mobile code. We propose a 
stochastic infection-immunization (INIM) model based on the standard Susceptible- 
Infected-Removed (SIR) epidemic model, and we get an explicit solution of this model 
using probability generating function (pgf.). Our experiments simulate the propagation of 
malicious mobile code with immunization. The simulation results match the theoretical 
results of the model, which indicates that it is reliable to use INIM model to predict the 
propagation of malicious mobile code at the early infection stage when immunization 
factor is considered.
In this dissertation, we also propose a control system that could automatically 
detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious mobile programs at the early infection 
stage. The detection method is based on the observation that a worm always opens as 
many connections as possible in order to propagate as fast as possible. To develop the 
detection algorithm, we extend the traditional statistical process control technique by 
adding a sliding window. We do the experiment to demonstrate the training process and 
testing process of a control system using both real and simulation data set. The 
experiment results show that the control system detects the propagation of malicious 
mobile code with zero false negative rate and less than 6% false positive rate. Moreover,
iii
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we introduce risk analysis using Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to limit the 
false positive rate. Examples of risk control using SPTR are presented. Furthermore, we 
analyze the network behavior using the propagation models we developed to evaluate the 
effect of the control system in a network environment. The theoretical analysis of the 
model shows that the propagation of malicious program is reduced when hosts in a 
network applied the control system. To verify the theoretical result, we also develop the 
experiment to simulate the propagation process in a network. The experiment results 
match the mathematical results.
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The security of a computer system or a network system includes the 
confidentiality, integrity and assurance of the system. The definitions of confidentiality, 
integrity and assurance are as follows [Phoha 2002]:
Confidentiality: “The property of not being divulged to the unauthorized parties. 
A confidentiality service assists in the prevention of disclosure of information to 
unauthorized parties.”
Integrity: “a condition in which data or a system itself has not been modified or 
corrupted without authorization.”
Assurance: “ensuring the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and 
non-repudiation of information and information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection and reaction capabilities to restore information systems.”
An intrusion is a series of malicious activities that attempts to comprise the 
security of a computer or a network system [Ye 2000]. An intrusion detection system 
analyzes the activities performed in a computer or network to look for evidence of 
malicious behavior. There are two categories of intrusion detection method. One is 
anomaly detection, and the other is misuse detection. Intrusion detection systems using
1
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the anomaly detection method generally build profiles for normal activities, and identify 
system activities which vary from the established profile as intrusion attempts [Eckmann 
2002]. An intrusion detection system using misuse detection technique builds a profile 
with signatures of known attacks and compares current activities with those signatures. 
An intrusion is signaled when there is a match between current activities and the profiled 
intrusion activities.
Both anomaly detection and misuse detection have advantages and disadvantages. 
Anomaly detection is able to detect unknown attacks, but there is always a trade off 
between false negative and false positive. False negative is defined as “events that are not 
flagged intrusive, although they actually are,” and false positive is defined as “anomalous 
activities that are not intrusive but are flagged as intrusive [Denning 1990].” Anomaly 
detection systems are also computationally expensive because we need to keep track of, 
and update all system profiles. Misuse detection has a relatively low false positive rate, 
but it cannot detect unknown attacks.
Intrusions exploit the flaws of the system architecture, the operating system, the 
server system, or the other software systems. A complete secure system is not really 
feasible because designing and implementing a totally secure system is an extremely 
difficult task. Flaws in the programs and operating systems are prevalent [Miller 1995]. 
In practice, it is not possible to build a completely secure system.
The financial loss caused by the intrusion of malicious programs accounts for a 
large amount of losses caused by computer security problems [Usa 2001]. The following 
section gives a brief view of malicious mobile code.
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1.2 Malicious Mobile Code
This section talks about malicious mobile code. We will discuss the current 
defense methods against malicious code and the general idea of mathematical modeling 
of malicious code propagation.
1.2.1 What Is Malicious Mobile Code?
A malicious mobile code is a software program intentionally designed to move 
from computer to computer or from network to network and modify the system without 
the consent of the user [Grimes 2001]. Major types of malicious mobile code include 
viruses, worms, Trojans, and rogue Internet content. The first malicious program is a 
computer virus developed by Fred Cohen [Cohen 1985, 1987] for research purpose. In 
the early 1980s, Cohen did extensive theoretical research as well as setting up and 
performing numerous practical experiments regarding viral type programs. Cohen's 
definition [Cohen 1994] of a computer virus is "a program that can 'infect' other programs 
by modifying them to include a version of itself." This definition has been generally 
accepted as a standard definition of a computer virus [Fites 1992] [Levin 1990].
Worms are very similar to viruses in that they are computer programs that 
replicate themselves and often, but not always contain some malicious functions that will 
disrupt the normal use of a computer system or a network system [Grimes 2001] 
[Denning 1990] [Levin 1990]. Unlike viruses, worms exist as separate entities; they do 
not attach themselves to other files or programs. Worms were first noticed as a potential 
computer security threat when Christmas Tree [Denning 1990] attacked IBM mainframes 
in December 1987. Christmas Tree is an executable file attached in an e-mail. Once 
executed, it displays a Christmas tree and sends a copy to everyone in the victim’s
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address list. Someone argued that Christmas Tree is not a true computer worm program 
but just a Trojan program with replicating mechanism [Denning 1990] [NISTIR4939]. 
The first computer worm, Morris, was released on November 2, 1988 [Spafford 1989a] 
[Spafford 1989b]. It utilized the TCP/IP protocols, common application layer protocols, 
operating system bugs, and a variety of system administration flaws to propagate. Morris 
infected approximately three thousand computers during eight hours o f activity 
[Spafford 1989a].
Malicious programs are created by exploiting the flaws of the system. Since it is 
impossible to design a perfect system, there is always a possibility for new malicious 
codes to be designed. The malicious function of these programs might be different, but 
they usually have similar infection strategy. For instance, one class o f worm programs 
always try to connect to as many hosts as possible so that they can be distributed easily 
and quickly through the network. The increasing connectivity of network and the 
growing use o f computers have led to more and more concerns about security problems 
caused by malicious mobile codes like worms. In the past few years, the fast spreading 
malicious mobile codes have disrupted tens of thousands of businesses and homes 
worldwide and caused millions of dollars in loss [Usa 2001]. Famous ones include Code 
Red [CERT01-19] and Nimda [CERT01-26] in 2001, SQL Slammer [CERT03-04], 
Blaster [CERT03-20] and Welchia [SYMANTEC03] in 2003, and Netsky [CERT04-02] 
and Sasser [CERT04-05] in 2004.
1.2.2 Defense against Malicious Mobile Code
Anti-virus tools are now installed on almost all computers to detect and prevent 
the spread of such programs. Common techniques applied by these tools are activity
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
monitors, integrity management systems and virus scanners [Kumar 1992]. Activity 
monitors alert users about system activity that is commonly associated with viruses. 
Integrity management system warns the user of suspicious changes that have been made 
to files. These two methods are quite generic, and can be used to detect unknown viruses 
in the system. The drawback of these two methods is that they often flag or prevent 
legitimate activities, and hence, disrupt normal work. As a consequence, the user may 
ignore their warnings altogether. Virus scanning is the most commonly used method for 
anti-virus tools because it is the most simple, economical way for virus detection. Virus 
scanners search files, boot records, memory and other locations where executable codes 
can be stored for characteristic byte patterns that occur in one or more known viruses. 
The drawback is that virus scanners rely on the priori knowledge of the viral code, which 
means they can only detect previously known viruses, but not new viruses. Thus, the 
scanner has to be updated frequently [Forrest 1994] [Kumar 1992] [Wang 2000]. [Xu 
2002] [Phoha 2003] and [Xu 2004] introduce a novel approach to control the spread of 
virus and presents a technique to make them ineffective which is a complement of current 
virus detection techniques. This approach models the process as a discrete event system 
such that supervisory control theory can be applied to control the reproduction and 
propagation of the malicious code. The drawback is that this approach is only effective 
for executable files whose execution process could be modeled as a discrete event 
system.
The detection of worm programs is still an open problem [White 1998], especially 
for unknown worms. Currently, the most general way is to embed the worm detection 
component in the anti-virus tools or intrusion detection systems. The methodology is
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similar as those used in the virus detection tools. In other words, use known signatures to 
catch the known worms. For unknown worms, we do not have a general solution yet.
1.2.3 Epidemic Modeling of Malicious Code
The epidemic modeling of biological viruses and their dissemination has a history 
of about three hundred years [Andersson 2000] [Daley 2001]. Daniel Bemoullli presented 
the first theoretical approach about the effects of the disease in 1760 [Daley 2001]. At 
that time, the smallpox was widespread in Europe and affected a large proportion of the 
population. In the early twentieth century, Ross and Hudson, Scoper, as well as Kermack 
and Mckendrick, began to provide a firm theoretical framework for the investigation of 
the infectious diseases [Anderson 1992], The mathematical models they provided help to 
understand the mechanism by which diseases spread to predict the future spreading of the 
epidemic and to control the spread of the diseases.
Epidemic modeling of malicious code has become a popular research topic for 
computer scientists since computer worm Morris was released in 1988 [Spafford 1989a] 
[White 1998]. Propagation modeling helps us to understand the life cycle and fast 
propagation nature of such malicious mobile codes. It also helps us understand the impact 
of countermeasures [Chen 2004] [Serazzi 2003], network traffic, and network topology 
[Satorras 2001][Satorras 2002]. The propagation models of malicious code are extensions 
of the classic epidemic models [Zou 2003] [Zou 2002] [Kephart 1991] [Boguna 2002] 
[Stamford 2002] [Wang 2003] [Chen 2003]. This dissertation will give the general classic 
epidemic models and the related works of malicious code propagation modeling in 
Chapter 2.
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1.3 The Contributions of This Dissertation
This dissertation first models the propagation of the malicious code using 
stochastic technique, then proposes a control system that automatically detects and 
mitigates the propagation of such a malicious code. The control system works as a 
complement to the current intrusion detection systems. The detection method of the 
control system belongs to the anomaly detection method. We analyze the normal 
connection behavior of a host and compare the current connection behavior with the 
normal behavior to identify the anomaly. The simulation experiment results match the 
theoretical results.
1.3.1 Propagation Modeling of Malicious Code
This dissertation introduces stochastic techniques to model the propagation of 
malicious mobile code. We build a stochastic propagation model that considers the 
factors of recovering and immunization. This model gives the probability that an 
infection will or will not happen instead of a deterministic yes-or-no answer that relies on 
the law of large numbers. This model also allows probabilistic analysis of the virus and 
propagation phenomenon. It is more precise than the deterministic method when we 
study the infection scale and speed inside a community or an organization with varying 
population size.
1.3.2 Early Detection and Propagation 
Mitigation of Malicious Code
This dissertation proposes a control system to detect the propagation of malicious 
code at the early infection stage. It also mitigates the propagation of malicious code over 
the network so that the overall damage to our society could be reduced. It is novel to 
apply the statistic process control technique to detect the malicious code. The general
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steps of building a control system are given and the details of each step are presented in 
simulation experiments. The framework of building the control system can be easily 
extended and applied to other scenarios.
1.3.3 Risk Control and Network Performance Analysis
This dissertation also introduced Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to 
control the false positive rate of the control system. Examples of risk control using SPRT 
are presented using simulation data. To analyze the network effect of the control system, 
we give a quantitative analysis of propagation mitigation. We build propagation models 
to describe the propagation behavior of malicious code inside a network with and without 
the control system. Mathematical analysis of both models shows a significant difference 
in propagation speed and scale when the control system is applied on every machine in 
the network. To verify the theoretical results, we simulate malicious code propagation on 
virtual network using computer programs. All simulation results match the theoretical 
results from the propagation model.
1.4 The Organization of This Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the 
background information and related research in both propagation modeling of malicious 
mobile code using epidemic models and the early detection of malicious code. Chapter 3 
introduces the stochastic method to describe the propagation models and proposes the 
Infection-Immunization (INIM) model using the stochastic techniques. Chapter 4 gives 
the framework of building a control system to detect and mitigate the malicious code, and 
then shows the experimental details of the training process and testing process of the 
control system. The testing results are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also presents the
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effect of the control system by analyzing the network performance. Both theoretical 
results and simulation results are presented. Chapter 5 is the conclusion and suggestions 
for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
This dissertation first uses stochastic techniques to model the propagation of 
malicious mobile code, and then proposes a control system to detect and mitigate the 
propagation of malicious mobile code at the early infection stage. The detection 
algorithm of the control system uses extended Process Control technique. This chapter 
provides background information of epidemic modeling, statistical Process Control, and 
related research in areas o f malicious code propagation modeling as well as early 
detection of malicious code.
2.1 Epidemic Models
The mathematical modeling of diseases and their propagation has a history of 
about three hundred years [Daley 2001]. Epidemic modeling has three main aims [Daley 
2001]. The first is to understand the mechanism by which diseases spread. The second 
aim is to predict the future course of the epidemic. The third aim is to understand how we 
may control the spread of the epidemic. A good epidemic model captures the essential 
features of the epidemic, makes reasonable predictions, and evaluates the effect of control 
method. The following two subsections give a brief review of the early mathematical 
models for the spread of infectious diseases. Readers who want a more detailed overview 
are referred to [Bailey 1975] and [Anderson 1992].
10
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2.1.1 Deterministic Modeling
In this section, we introduce two classical deterministic epidemic models, the 
Susceptible Infected (SI) model and Susceptible, Infected and Removed (SIR) model. 
Both models assume that the population is homogeneously mixed. If we consider each 
individual as a vertex in a graph, from the graph theory point of view, a homogeneously 
mixed population means a fully connected graph.
2.1.1.1 Deterministic SI model
In this model, each host stays in one of the two states: susceptible (S) or infectious
(I). SI model assumes that once a host is infected, it becomes infectious and it will never 
become susceptible again. The only state transition is: S -> I (see Figure 2.1).
N  is the size of the population;
S(t) -  S  is the number of susceptible hosts at time t, 
I(t) = I  is the number of infected hosts at time t.
P  is the pair wise infection rate.
At any time t, we have S(t) + I(t) = N.
Using Ordinary Differential Equation, we have
Susceptible Infected
Figure 2.1: State transition of SI model.
^ = /» ( < ) /»
at
2.1
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which is the same as
^ p -  = P ( N - m ) l ( t )  2.2
at
Let k - ) 6N, i(t) = I{t) / N , Equation 2.2 becomes
^ = 4 - i ( o K o
at
ekt
=> *'(0 = ekt - c  
I  - N





( N - I 0) + I 0eu ’ 
which is the same as
Figure 2.2 shows the infection evolution process given N = 10000, /3 = 1/ N  I 0 =1.
time units
Figure 2.2: Infection evolution of SI Model.
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Figure 2.2 illustrates that the infection evolution procedure can be roughly divided 
into three stages: the slow starting stage, the fast spreading stage, and the saturating stage. 
Let i(t) = I(t)/N, at the beginning, when i(t) —>■ 0, the number of infectious hosts grows 
almost exponentially.
From Equation 2.3, time t needed to infected I  individuals of the whole population 
is derived as
1 , (N - I 0)I
t =  In- —  2.4
fiN (N -1 )1 0
Table 2.1 presents the time steps needed to infect certain proportion of the population 
with a different number of initially infected individual I 0. The time step values in all the
three tables (Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3) are calculated using Equation 2.4.
Table 2.1: Time steps needed to infect /  individuals when 70 varies
(N=  10000, f i  = 0.0001)
100 1000 5000 9999
i 4.61 6.91 9.21 18.42
10 2.31 4.71 6.91 16.12
100 — 2.40 4.59 13.81
Table 2.1 shows that as the initial number of infected nodes / 0 increases, the time
steps needed to infect the population decrease dramatically at the beginning. For 
example, the time steps needed to infect 1,000 individuals in a population of 10,000 when 
I 0 is 100 is almost one third of the time steps needed when I 0 is 1. But the time steps 
needed to infect the whole population does not change that much as we can see from
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Table 2.1. Table 2.2 presents the time steps needed to infect a certain proportion of the 
population when population size N  varies.
Table 2.2: Time steps needed to infect certain percentage of N  when /V varies
( I o = l , 0  = l / N )
N/100 N/10 N/2 N-l
1000 2.31 4.71 6.91 13.81
10000 4.61 7.01 9.21 18.42
100000 6.92 9.31 11.80 23.02
Table 2.2 shows that when the population size increases, the time steps needed to 
infect the same proportion of the population also increase, and they increase faster at the 
beginning (I = N/100) than near the end (I = N/2). From Table 2.2, we know that when 
population N increases, the slow starting stage gets longer. Table 2.3 gives the time steps 
needed to infect a certain number of individuals when N  varies.
Table 2.3: Time steps needed to infect I  individuals when N  varies
( I 0 = l , / 3  = l / N )
5 10 100 500 999
1000 1.61 2.31 4.71 6.91 13.81
10000 1.61 2.30 4.62 6.27 7.01
100000 1.61 2.30 4.61 6.22 6.92
From Table 2.3, we observe that the infection is slow at the very beginning. It 
infects less than 10 individuals during the first two time steps. Then suddenly it increases
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almost exponentially. During the next two time steps, more than 50 individuals are 
infected. The infection slows down when the infection comes to the third stage. It takes 
almost the same time steps to infect a certain number of individuals (see Table 2.3), but it 
takes more time steps to infect the whole population if  the population size is larger (see 
the last column of Table 2.2).
2.1.1.2 Deterministic SIR model
The first complete mathematical model for the propagation of infectious diseases 
was a deterministic model given by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927 [Dailey 2001]. In 
this model, each host is in one of the three states: susceptible (S), infectious (I), or 
removed (R). This model assumes that once a host is infected, it will recover or die in the 
end. Whether dead or recovered, it will never be susceptible to the same disease; 
therefore, it will stay in the removed state forever. So the state transitions of the SIR 
model is: S -» I ->R  (see Figure 2.3).
RemovedInfected
Figure 2.3: State transition of SIR model.
If we let R(t) represent the number of removed hosts at time t, then we have N  = 








= - m ) m
= PS(t)I{t)-yI{t)  
= yl(t)
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with initial conditions S(0) = S0, 1(0) = I Q, and R(0) -  0 .
The Kermack-McKendrick model improves the SI model by considering that the 
infectious hosts may recover or die after some time. But this model does not consider the 
immunization of the susceptible hosts while immunization has become a very popular 
way, not only to prevent the outbreak of the infectious diseases, but also to prevent the 
outbreak of the infectious malicious code.
2.1.2 Stochastic Modeling
Stochastic modeling has been used to model the growth of population, the price 
changing of the stock market, the queuing process, etc. This section gives a brief 
introduction to stochastic process and stochastic epidemic modeling of diseases.
2.1.2.1 Introduction to stochastic process
A stochastic process is a family of random variables X(t) describing an empirical 
process whose development is governed by probability laws [Chiang 1980]. The time 
parameter t could be either discrete or continuous. In diffusion processes, both X(t) and t 
are continuous variables, while in Markov chains, X(t) and t take discrete values. The 
main interest is the probability distribution p k (t) = Pr{X(t) - k } ,  k  = 0 ,1, 2,3 • • • .
2.1.2.2 Stochastic epidemic modeling
A simple stochastic epidemic modeling assumes that the population consists of 
only susceptible individuals and infective individuals. Once a susceptible individual is 
infected, it becomes infective and stays at the infected state forever. Let random variable 
X(t) = S(t), and Y(t) = I(t), recall that S(t)+I(t) = N, so X(t)+Y(t) = N, then the only 
transition from t to t + A is (S, I) to ( S  - 1 , /  +1) with probability /?.
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We have Pr{(X, Y){t + A) = (S -1 , /  +1) | (X,  Y)(t) = (S , /)} = J3SIA + o(A ), 
and Pr {(Z, Y)(t + A) = (S , I)  \ (X, Y)(t) = (S , /)} = 1 -  J3SIA -  o(A)
where o(a ) represents the higher order function of A such thato(A)/A -> 0 when A -> 0. 
Then, the forward Kolmogorov equation system for the state probability 







= - j3 ( N - I ) I p N(t)
= -/3i{N -  I )Pi(t) + /?(/ +1 )(N - 1 -1  )pM (0  
= - f3 (N - \ ) IPl(t)
In matrix form, for P(t) = ( p N (t), p N_x (t), ■ ■ ■, p 0 (t))r , we have
= -/3
1 1 0 0 o' Pn O)**-111 1 1 + 0 0 p N-\(t)
0 +1 
..
11 (N  -  2)(7 + 2) 0 PN-2(t)




We can use the matrix analysis [Dailey 2001] to solve the equations, and the 
solution is known to be P(t) = e~pAt p (0). But the explicit result is not easy to be derived 
with this method. We may use Laplace transform or probability generation function or a 
mixture of both to obtain the explicit solution. This dissertation uses the probability 
generation function (pgf) to get the probability that /  individuals are infected at time t. 
We will introduce pgf in Chapter 3 and show the details of using pgf technique to solve 
the stochastic propagation model of malicious mobile code.
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2.2 Literature Review of Malicious Mobile Code 
Propagation Modeling
A reliable propagation model helps us to understand the life cycle of a self- 
replicating program, to predict the propagation scale and speed, and to estimate the effect 
of factors like network topology, network traffic, and countermeasure techniques [Chen 
2004] [Serazzi 2003] [Satorras 2001].
Kepart and White [Kephart 1991] built a SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) 
model to model the virus propagation, and use deterministic Ordinary Differential 
Equations (ODEs) to approximate the SIS model. They also present hierarchical model 
and spatial model in [Kephart 1991]. Later, they introduced the Kill signal as a 
countermeasure to reduce the spreading of computer virus and build a model for virus 
propagation with the Kill signals and concluded that the Kill signal is effective in 
reducing the spread of the virus [Kephart 1993]. Stamford et al. [Staniford 2002] 
constructed deterministic SI (Susceptible-Infected) model based on the empirical data 
from the outbreak of the Code Red worm. Serazzi and Zanero [Serazzi 2003] surveyed 
the existing models for virus and worm and came out with a compartment-based model 
that deals with the propagation inside and outside of an Autonomous System (a sub­
network administered by a single authority). Zou et al. [Zou 2002] gave a model for Code 
Red Worm propagation based on the classical SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Removed) 
model. They introduced two factors that might affect the worm propagation; that is, the 
countermeasure effect and decreased infection rate because of Internet congestions 
caused by the worm. Ramualado Pastor-Satorras et al. studied the effects of network 
topology on epidemic models [Boguna 2002] [Satorras 2001] [Satorras 2002].
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All the above models use a deterministic approach to represent the models; that is, 
the models are described by a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) except 
[Kephart 1991]. [Kephart 1991] gave a linear birth and death process when discussing the 
expected lifetime of the infection.
Under the homogeneous assumption, every individual in the population is 
assumed to be equally likely to infect or to be infected by every other individual. This 
approximation works well when each individual has many randomized contacts with 
others. However, if the number of contacts that a typical individual has with others is 
fairly small and/or the pattern of contacts is more or less localized, the homogeneous 
approximation fails. We suspect that the majority of today's computer populations are 
characterized by a degree of sparsity and locality that invalidates the homogeneous 
mixing approximation. In this dissertation, we introduced a factor B, the average number 
of contactors an individual could have, into the epidemic models.
Although ODEs can be safely used to approximate a stochastic process when the 
population size is large, it is more accurate to use stochastic models when the population 
size varies. Moreover, the spread of infectious disease or malicious programs is actually 
stochastic [Zou 2003] [Daley 2001] [Andersson 2000], so it is natural to model it with the 
stochastic model. The stochastic model gives the probability that an event will happen 
instead of deterministic yes-or-no answer relying on the law of large numbers [Andersson 
2000]. Actually, when the population size is big, it shows that the deterministic model is 
the convergence of a stochastic model. We believe both models are important to 
understand the propagation of a malicious mobile program like a worm or a virus.
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Andersson and Britton [Andersson 2000] concluded that stochastic models are preferred 
when their analysis is possible; otherwise, the deterministic model should be used.
This dissertation focuses on the stochastic propagation characteristics of malicious 
mobile programs; thus, we use stochastic models to describe the spreading of a malicious 
program over the Internet. The benefits of the stochastic model are: (1) It gives the 
probability of whether or not an infection will happen instead of a deterministic yes-or-no 
answer relying on the law of large numbers; (2) It allows probabilistic analysis of the 
malicious code propagation phenomenon; (3) It is more precise than the deterministic 
method when we study the infection process inside a community or organization where 
the population size varies; and (4) We could further derive the waiting time for the 
occurrence of the Ath infection based on the stochastic model.
2.3 Literature Review of Early Detection 
of Malicious Mobile Code
The propagation speed of malicious code has increased dramatically in recent 
years. As we pointed out before, a malicious code spreads almost exponentially at the 
early infectious stage when there is no counter action taken, so we need to respond 
automatically before it is identified. Cliff Zou [Zou 2003] proposed an early detection 
system by monitoring the illegitimate network traffic. A Kalman filter is used to detect 
the presence of a worm by detecting the trend. When the monitoring system encounters a 
singe of illegitimated network traffic, the Kalman filter is activated. The traffic is claimed 
to be caused by worm propagation when the estimated infection rate stabilized and 
oscillated a little bit around a constant positive value. One disadvantage of the approach 
is that the machine will be quarantined when illegitimated traffic is detected. This may
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irritate the users when false alarm happens. Users tend to disable the intrusion detection 
system even when the false alarm rate is not very high.
[Williamson 2002] proposed a filter algorithm based on the observation of 
connection behavior. Evidence from [Heberlein 1990] and [Hofineyr 1999] showed that 
during virus propagation, an infected machine will connect to as many machines as 
possible in order to spread as fast as possible. The idea of the filter algorithm is to use a 
series of timeouts to restrict the rate of connections to the new hosts; any traffic that 
attempts to connect at a higher rate is delayed. The filtering mechanism is user 
transparent, which means a user cannot take active actions to remove the malicious code 
and fix the system flaws the malicious program exploits.
The control system we proposed here is based on the same observation as in 
[Williamson 2002]. We applied statistical Process Control technique to automatically 
detect and mitigate the propagation of the malicious code. The advantages of this 
approach are: (1) The detection delay is small; the propagation of a malicious code can be 
detected as the very first beginning; (2) An explicit message will be given when anomaly 
connection behavior is detected so that a user could take active counteractions to fight for 
the malicious program; (3) The propagation rate of the malicious code is reduced 
automatically so that the overall damage is reduced; and (4) The control system does not 
disconnect the machine from the Internet so that users will not feel annoyed caused by 
the false alarms. Furthermore, we could give a mathematical estimation of the 
propagation mitigation scale using mathematical propagation models. Besides, the 
hypothesis test underlying the detection algorithm gives quantitative evaluation of the 
false alarm rate.
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2.4 Statistical Process Control
2.4.1 A Brief Review of Process Control
The use of statistical method in process control began at the Bell Lab in the 1920s 
[Hansen 1987], It has been widely used in the industry to manage, monitor and control 
the production quality [Hansen 1987]. The basic idea of Process Control is collecting and 
analyzing the past data, and comparing new data with past data to identify process 
violations.
Figure 2.4 gives the general outline of statistical Process Control. To apply 
Process Control techniques, we assume that the sample data follows normal distribution. 
Thus, when a process is in control, we know (1) about 68% of the plotted points lie in one 
standard deviation of the central line and 34% at each side; (2) about 13.5% of the plotted 
points lie in between one and two standard deviations on both sides of the central line; 
and (3) about 2.5% of the plotted points lie in between two standard deviations and three 
standard deviations. If the quality of a product changes, the plotted points will not follow 
the variation patterns given above. The operator needs to investigate the possible causes 
and adjuss it so that the quality of production is consistent. Control charts, like X  chart 
and R chart, are useful tools to help us visualize the quality control so that we can identify 
the change of quality more easily and straightforward.
The hypothesis being tested at the monitoring period is
H 0 -Mx = Mo
against the alternative
H x - Mx *  Mo
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where ji0 comes from the base period and jux is the mean of the sample data we just 
collected. There are two types of error defined with this hypothesis test. One is called 
type I error ( a ) ,  which is defined as the probability that we reject H 0 when H 0is true.
Type I error also means the probability when a point is beyond the control limit, and we 
identify it as a signal of quality change but actually it is not. Another one is called type II 
error (/?), which is defined as the probability that we accept H 0 when H 0 is not true.
Type II error is also the probability of a point is inside the control limit, and we identify 
the process is under control, but the process is actually out of control. The power of the 
hypothesis test is given by (l -  /?). In industry, control limits are usually established at 
three standard deviations from the central line. Then, the probability that a type I error 
will occur is 0.26%.
Algorithm: Outline of Process Control 
Phase 1: Base period
Step 1: Collect sample data 
Step 2: Estimate the parameters 
Step 3: Calculate the control limits 
Step 4: Check each observation of the base data 
Step 5: If it is over control limits, remove it and back to step 2 
Step 6: If all observations are within the control limits 
Extend the control limits to monitoring period
Phase 2: Monitoring period
Use the control limits established during base period to test the hypothesis 
that “the process is in control”.
Figure 2.4: Outline of process control.
We can see the idea of Process Control is very similar to the idea of anomaly 
detection, which is profiling the normal pattern of an object and comparing the current
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pattern with the profile to determine the possible violation. We will apply Process
Control technique to design the detection algorithm of the control system.
2.4.2 An Overview of Building the Control 
System Using Process Control 
Techniques
The control system includes a controller and a monitor. It takes three phases to 
build the proposed control system. Phase one is the training period during which the 
monitor collects normal connection behavior as the base data, then the control rule is 
defined for the controller using the base data. Phase two is the testing phase during which 
the reliability of the control system is tested using both normal and abnormal connection 
data. Phase three is the monitoring period during which the controller checks each and 
every observation the monitor collected to determine whether the current activity of the 
machine is legal.
This dissertation extends the traditional Process Control technique by adding a 
sliding window so that the base data always includes the most recent normal 
observations. This makes our system adaptive to the changes of process mean, and the 
false alarm rate is therefore reduced. The experiments demonstrate the reliability and 
flexibility of the control system. Furthermore, we present and compare the propagation 
models of malicious mobile code with and without the control system in order to evaluate 
the effect of the control system. The theoretical analysis shows that the detection method 
is effective and the propagation is reduced more when more hosts adopt the control 
system. Later, we simulate the propagation of malicious mobile programs in a network 
with a certain number of nodes. The simulation results match our theoretical analysis,
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which indicate a success of the propagation models and verify the effectiveness of the 
control system.
The idea of our approach is simple and straightforward, and so is Williamson’s 
approach [Williamson 2002], People did not think about it before, mainly because most 
people concentrate on how to protect ourselves from being infected. We install anti-virus 
tools, firewalls, filters, and intrusion detection systems to keep us secure. But people 
seldom think about minimizing the damage over the whole network if  we have been 
infected unfortunately by a malicious program. This dissertation provides a mechanism to 
not only detect but also reduce the propagation of malicious codes at the early infection 
stage so that human beings could gain precious time to take counter actions like patching 
their system or upgrading their anti-virus tools to fight for the malicious mobile code.
2.5 Summary
This chapter provided the background information and related works of this 
dissertation. We first introduced the deterministic and stochastic models of epidemic 
modeling, and then we showed how epidemic modeling has been used to model the 
propagation of malicious code. We talked about the related work of early detection of 
malicious code and discussed the advantages of our detection system. After that, we 
introduced the process control technique and showed the framework of building the 
proposed control system using the process control technique.
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CHAPTER 3
STOCHASTIC PROPAGATION MODELING 
OF MALICIOUS MOBILE CODE
This chapter uses stochastic modeling to model the propagation of malicious 
mobile code. Standard SI model and SIR model assume that the population is 
homogeneous. In fact, the number of individuals a given individual contacted in a certain 
period of time is limited. In this chapter, we introduce a new factor B, the average 
number of neighbors an individual has, into our model. In this dissertation, machine g  
becomes one of the neighbors of machine h only when machine g  and machine h have 
direct contact with each other; for example, g sends an email to h, g  downloads a file 
from h, g  visits the website provided by h, etc., and vice versa.
We first present a stochastic SI model, and show how to get the explicit solution 
of the SI model using the pgf technique; then we present the stochastic INIM (Infection- 
Immunization) model which models the propagation of malicious code at the early 
infection stage. We get the approximate solution of INIM model using the pgf technique. 
We simulate the propagation evolution of a malicious mobile code using the INIM 
model. The theoretical results approximate the simulation results, which indicates that we 
can use the theoretical model to predict the propagation of malicious mobile code.
26
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3.1 Stochastic SI Model for Malicious 
Code Propagation
The standard SI model divides the computer systems into two groups: one is 
susceptible, and the other is infected. Any system is at either susceptible state or at 
infected state. In the SI model, we assume that if a machine gets infected, it will never 
recover and become susceptible again, so the only state transition is S -» I.
Let,
N be  the size of the population.
I  it) = i : denote the number of infected machine at time t.
P i j ( 0 , t )  = Pr(/(0  = j  11 ( 0 )  =  i )  i, j  =  0 ,1, 2,• • - where p i j ( 0 , t )  denotes the probability
of j  infections at time t,  given that there are i infections at time zero.
P : The infection rate. In reality, this rate varies over time because the propagation of 
malicious code depends on the network bandwidth. At the beginning, a copy of the 
malicious code could always infect a susceptible machine successfully since the 
bandwidth of the network is enough to transfer all the byte stream of the malicious code, 
while later on, each copy of the malicious code could not reach the susceptible machine 
successfully because of the network traffic congestion; therefore, the infection rate 
decreases over time. In our model, for simplicity, we assume the infection rate to be a 
constant.
B : The number of machines that could be contacted by each machine during certain time 
unit. Generally, B would vary, but for simplicity, we assume that B is a constant. B  is the 
same as the population size N  in a homogeneous network, because any machine could 
contact any other machine in the population at any time.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
28
Assume that one machine is infected at the beginning, and A is a small time interval in 
which no more than one infection could happen within it. Let o(A) represent any function 
of A which tends to 0 faster than A . Following the analysis of a simple Poisson process, 
we have:
(1) The probability that exactly one infection event happens in ( t , t  + A) is 
J3B(1 -  i / N)(i -  l)A + o(A ). This is so because in time interval A, one infected 
machine could contact B  machine, and i?(l -  i / N)  of those are susceptible, so 
f3B(\ -  i / N)A machines could be infected by one infected machine. Now, the 
number of infected machines is (i -1 ) ,  so the total number of machines that could 
be infected in time interval A is /3B(\ -  i / N ^ i  -  l)A . Hence, ySfi(l - i / N ) ( i -  l)A 
is the probability that exactly one infection occurs. At the early infection stage 
i « N , so the probability that one infection event occurs is 
approximately j3B(i -  l)A . Since the probability that i-1 infection happened in (0, 
t) is A,;-i(O,0, probability that i infection events occur in time interval 
(0, t + A) is Pij^i (0, t) [/3B(i -  l)A + o(A)].
(2) The probability that more than one event, say q events, occurs during time 
interval A is o(A ). The probability that i - q  infection events happen in time
interval (0, t) is So, the probability that i infection happen in time
interval (0, t + A) is o(A).
(3) The probability that no event occurs in time interval A is 1 -  /3BiA -  o{A ). The 
probability that all infection events happen in (0, t)  is />u (0,t). So, the
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probability that i infection events happen in time interval (0, t + A) is 
P \ , i  (0,0[1 -  fiBiA -  o(A)].
Since only one of the above three is possible and they are mutually exclusive, we can 
combine all the three possibilities, so we have
P \ , i  (0> t + A) = P i  i-\ (o, t) [0B(i -  1)A + o(A)] + p x. (0,0[1 -  /IBiA -  o(A)]
+ Pu-q(Q̂ )  ° (A)-
Moving p u (0,t) from the right side to the left, and dividing both sides by A,
since -> 0 , we get 
A
P' ’(°’l + A) = - Phl(o,t)fiBi + pu^{0,t)pB(i - 1).
Therefore, we have 
dpXJ(0,t)
=  ~ P u  ( ° » l ) P B i  +  A ,  i - i  ( ° >  f ) P B (* ~  0  3  • 1 • 1dt
The initial conditions are as follows. According to our assumption that only one machine 
is infected at time* = 0, sop xl(0,0) = 1, and the probability of more than one machine
being infected is zero, so p xi (0,0) = 0, z > 1.
We use probability generation function (pgf) to solve Equation 3.1.1. The pgf is 
given by
00
Gi M = T lPu(°>ty  3-L2
1=1
By differentiating Equation 3.1.2, and substituting Equation 3.1.1, we get
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We can ignore 
the values of the 
first term when i 
+Bj3s2Y d{ i - l )p hi_l{0 , ty -2 = 0 and of the
<>i i>i second term




= - B j 3 s ^ -  + Bfis2^ -  3.1.3
ds ds
which can be written as
^  = B / 3 s { s - \ ) ^ ~  
dt ds
^  _  B J3s(s -  \ ) ^ -  =  0 3 .1 .4
dt ds
To solve the partial differential equation of 3 .1 .4 ,  we write the auxiliary equations
ds
=> ----------= Bfddt and dG,(s;t) = 0.
s ( l - s )
Using the following equality,
r 1 1 t 2ax + b - y l b 2 - 4 ac 2—  -------------------  - In ...................   if b - 4 a c  > 0
ax +bx + c -db2 - 4 a c  2ax + b + sib2 -4 a c  
we get,
=> In — = B(3t + c =>——  = ceBpt => - —- e Bfit = constant 
s - 1 5 - 1  s
From the second auxiliary equation, we get G7 (s;t) = constant.
Therefore, the general solution of 3 .1 .4  is
5 —1
Gf (s;t) = 0 ( ------e Rfit ) where O is an arbitrary differentiable function.
5
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To obtain the particular solution, plug in the initial condition, and we get
5 - 1 1  1
Let 0 =  => 5 = ------- , we get 0 (0 ) -= ------
5 1 - 0  1 - 0
1So, G,(s;t) = 0 (  * '* )  = — — ------   ^
s + s — 1 nnt s — \s  — Y)e
s
The solution of Equation 3.1.4 is
g > M = - -  (5 -  \)eE 3.1.5





15—1 " ( s - ( s -  \ ) e » nB f $ t \ 2  ' 5=1
Taking the second order derivative, we get
m i -  d ] = ^ = ( - 2)
l - e B[St
e B p t  I s = i  = (~2)(1 -  eBpt )eW\„Bpt
ds2 ( s - ( s -  \)eBptf
So, the variance of / is a 2 = e \i 2 ] -  (£[/])2 = E[l(l - 1)] + £ [ /] -  (^[f])2
= (—2)(1 -  em  )em  + eBpt -  (eBp‘ f  = eBpt (em  - 1)
Taking the z'th order derivative, we could get
d ‘G = K  iv '-i;, (1 - e BptT Xem  _ M (1 -eBptr leBpt
ds1 i\ \ s - ( s -  \)eBpt)M =0 {em Y









According to the properties of pgf, we get
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3.1.8
3.2 Infection-Immunization (INIM) Model 
for Worm Propagation
In the Infection-Immunization model, the population is divided into three groups; 
that is, susceptible, infected, and removed, which is the same as the standard SIR model. 
The difference is that instead of recovered and therefore immunized after infected, a 
machine could be immunized when it is healthy, which makes the propagation model 
closer to reality because, for example, a computer user could immunize a machine by 
downloading the patch or updating the anti-virus tool when the users get the message 
about the malicious program. Both [Zou 2002] and [Wong 2004] present similar ideas of 
immunization from a healthy machine, but neither of them gives a stochastic analysis of 
their models.
Figure 3.1 shows the state transitions of epidemic propagation. The removed 
machines include those immunized when still healthy and those recovered after infected. 
A recovered machine is immunized and cannot be infected by the same worm again. If 
we do not specify, the immunized machine includes both cases. In Figure 3. l ,a,/3,  and 
y  are the immunization rate, infection rate and recover rate, respectively. 
s ( ‘) = s is the number of susceptible machines at time t.
/(<)=/ is the number of infected machines at time t.
M(l) = m is the number of immunized machines at time t.




. S ©  ,
Infected
(infectious)
x  Removed x  
(immunized or recovered) 
v M(t) >
Figure 3.1: State transition diagram of INIM model.
3.2.1 Stochastic Analysis of INIM Model
Assume that only one machine is infected at time zero, and A is a small time 
interval in which no more than one infection could happen within it. To build the INIM 
model, following the similar analysis of SI model, we have:
(1) The probability that exactly one infection event happens in (t, t + A) is 
J3BQ. -  (i - 1)/ N  -  m / N)(i -  l)A+ o(A). This is so because in time interval A, one 
infected machine could contact B machine, and ( l - ( z - l ) / A  - m l  N)  A of those are 
susceptible, so 0 B ( l - ( i  - 1)/ N  - m l  N)  A machines could be infected by one infected 
machine. Now, the total number of infected machine is (i - 1), so the number of 
machines that could be infected in time interval A is ySS(l -  (z - 1 ) / N  - m  / N)(i -  l)A . 
We assumed that A is a small time interval that no more than one event could occur 
within it. Hence, f3B(l -  (i - 1)/ N  - m l  N)(i -  l)A is the probability that exactly one 
infection occurs. At the early stage of infection, since i «  N  and m «  N , the 
probability o f one infection is approximately Bj3(i- l)A+o(A) . The probability that
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i - 1 infection events happen in (0,/) is (0,f); therefore, the probability that i 
infection occur in time interval (0, t + A) is p u _x (0,t)( J3B(i -  l)A+ o(A)).
(2) The probability that exactly one recover event occurs in (t, t + A) is (i + l)yA + o(A ). 
This is so because the probability that one infected machine is recovered during time 
interval A is yA . The total number of infected machine is i +1, so the number of 
machine that could be recovered during A is (i + l)yA. We assumed that A is a small 
time interval that no more than one event could occur within it. Hence, the probability 
that exactly one recover occurs is (i + \)yA. The probability that i +1 infection event 
happens in (0, t) is p l M (0,t) ; therefore, the probability that i infection occurs in 
time interval (0, t + A ) is p X M (0,/)( (z + l)/A+ o(A)).
(3) The probability that exactly i infection events happen in (0, t) and the number of 
infection events does not change, i.e., no infection or recover occurs, during (t, t + A ) 
is (l -  pBiA -  iyA -  o(A)). So the probability that i infection occurs in time interval 
(0, t + A ) is p u (0,fXl- pBiA - i y A - o ( A)).
(4) The probability that more than one infection, say q infections, occurs during time 
interval A, but no recover occurs is o(A). The probability that i -  q infection events
happen in time interval (0, t) is p hî (0 , t }  So, the probability that i infection happens 
in time interval (0, t + A) is p X i_q (0,t) o(A) .
(5) The probability that more than one recover events, say q recover events, occur during 
time interval A but no infection occurs is o(A). The probability that i + q infection
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events happen in time interval (0, t) is p hi+q(0,t} So, the probability that i infection
occur in time interval (0, t + A) is p u+q (0,t) o(A ).
Since only one of the above six is possible and they are mutually exclusive, we can
combine all three possibilities, so we have
p hi(0,t + A)= (l -  PBiA -  iyA -  o(A))/?u (0,r)
+ A,m ( 0 ,0 [ ^ ( i -1)A + O(A)]
+ Pv+i (°»0 [O' + 0 rA + ° (A)] 
+ Pu-i (°»*) ° (A) + P u*  ( ° > ° ( A>
Moving p u (0,t) from the right side to the left, and dividing both sides by A,
since —> 0 , we get 
A
P,J(0,t + A ) - p u (0,l ) = (_ m _ i r )  M
A
+  P l , i -
+ P v + i M ( i + l )y
Therefore, the differential equation is
dphj®’l l  = -  iy )pXi (0, t)
+ p u _x(Q,t)PB{i-\)  3-2-1
+Pi,1+i(°^X i'+ 1V
The initial conditions are as follows. According to our assumption that only one machine
is infected at timet = 0, sopI t(0,0) = 1, and the probability of more than one machine
being infected is zero, so p xi (0,0) = 0, i > 1.
Define pgf as
oo
G , M = I > u ( 0 > 'y  3.2.2
i= l
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Differentiating Equation 3.2.2 and substituting Equation 3.2.1, we have
= z  dPuf f -  = i y  H/®* -  (°>o+Pv-i (°»om* -  o +a,,+i (o, *x* -at t at i 
By extending the summation to each term, we get
i
+ Z  P u -ifeO M 1' - 1)5'
i
+ Z  /vi(°>*X*‘+1V
i
Rearranging each term, we get
i
+ s 2Z  ,
i
+ Z  /V ifeO fr'+ iW
i
which can be written as
dG / _ \ dG DO 2 dG dG—  = -{BP + y )s —  + BPs2—  + y — . 
at as as cts
Let BP = A , we get
r/G /„ \ r/G . 2 ^G <̂ G . . 2 \ \ ^G „
—  = -(A  + y >  —  + As2 —  + y —  = > —  - (A s 2 - ( A  +  y )s  +  y ) —  = 0
dt ds ds ds dt ds
To solve partial differential Equation 3.2.3, we write the auxiliary equations
dsdt = ------ ;— ------r  and dG, (s;t) = 0
-  (As ~(A + y )s  + y )
I f  A > y
From the first auxiliary equation, we get
[dt = f -------;— j—----r ds.
-  (As ~ ( A  + y )s  + y )
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Using the following equality
r 1 1 , 2ax + b--yjb2 -Aac  . . ,  2 . „—  ----------- = —...-.-••••••-— In-------------- if  b -Aac  > 0,
Jax +bx + c V^2 -Aac  2ax + b + 4b2 -Aac
(In this case, a = - l , b= (A + y),  c = - y , Vb2 -Aac  = ^ j ( A - y )2 = A - y )
1 -2As  + (A + y ) - ( A - y )  1 A s - yw get C + t = -------- In-----------------------  ̂ — = ------- In- '
A - y  -  2 As + (A + y) + ( A - y )  A - y  1(5 -1)
/Ls"
c.e(l~7)> = -------— where c, is the new constant contains C.
' 1 (5 -1 ) 1
( 5 - 1 )
c7ea r)t = ——— where c7 is the new constant contains c ,. 
2 (5-1) 2 1
e a - r » ( L J L  = C2
A s - y
From the second auxiliary equation, we get Gf (s; t) = constant. Therefore, the general 
solution of Gf (s;t) is
G(s;t) = a > { ^ 9 - e (*-r)t}
A s - y
To obtain the particular solution, plug in the initial condition, we get
G(5;0) = p lt (0 ,0 )5 ' = 5 (see initial conditions of Equation 3.2.1)
so G(s;0) = <D{ e(X-y)0} = <D{ = 5 .
As — y A s - y
Let 6 = =>s = ^ l z l  w egeto ( 0 ) = . - f c i
A s - y  0 1 -1  0A- 1
Therefore, the particular solution is
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y —  L g f 1 -? ') '
G(s .t) = Oi  ( s - V  CW } ~  ** ~ y _________ y ( s - \ ) e ^ r)t - ( A s - y )
t e - r  x l z L e( ^ _ !  M s - i ) e ^ - ( A s - r )
A s - y
_ y( 1 -  s)e{ r) + (As -  y)
~ A ( l - s ) e (X~r)t + ( A s -y )
If A, < y , from the first auxiliary equation, we get
\dt = f  --------— - 4  r ds.
■* •* -  (As -  (A + y)s + y)
Using the following equality,
r 1 1 , 2ax + b - ^ b 2 -  Aac .Cl2 A—   = , = l n ..............................  if b -Aac  > 0,
Jax +bx + c ^ ( b 2 -4ac)  lax  + b + Vh2 -  Aac
(In this case, a= -  A, b= (A + y),  c = -  y , Vh2 -  Aac = -yJ(y-A)2 = y - A )  
we get
t+ c = - ! ~  ln^ - V + r ) - V - r )
y - A  2As - ( A  + y) + ( A - y )  y - A  A s - y
Similar to solving the equation when A > y ,  we have 
(r-X)t _ M s ~ 1)cxe
A s - y  
cxeir~‘i>t IA(r-w s 3 _  C* - 1 )
A s - y
e(r-»i*LJL = c
s - 1 2
AsThe general solution of the second auxiliary equation isG(s;t) = <E>{ - e iy~X)t )
s -1
Using the initial condition of Equation 3.2.1, we haveG(s;0) = /?n (0,0)5'1 = s .
3.2.4
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So, G(j;0) = ®{— ^ e (y-Z)0} = = s .
5 -1  5 -1
Let0 = ̂ Z  r~e
5 - 1  x - e  x - e
Therefore, the particular solution is
 y_p(>'-w
G(S;0  = 4
yl t e - r  cM t  X ( s - l ) - ( X s - y ) e (r~X)t 
5 - 1
If A = y , we have
l d t = I  - ( ^ - ( l  + rV  + y ) * '
Using the following equality,
f— -— ------- = ------  —  if b2 -Aac  = 0,
J ax +bx + c lax  + b
(In this case, a = -  X , b= (A + / ) ,  c = -  / ,  Vb2 -  Aac = y j ( y -X ) 2 -  0 ) 
we get
2 2 1
t + C — ■
• 2/ls + (X + y) 2ys ~ (y  + y) y(s - 1) 
1 -t = C
y ( s - 1)
The general solution of the second auxiliary equation is
G ( s ; ( )  =  ® { — ! - — - ( }
r ( 5 - i )
Using the initial condition of Equation 3.2.1, we have G(s;0) = ®{—  ------- 0}
y(s ~ 1)




Let 6 = ------ -—  =>5 = 1 + —  ,
y ( s - 1) By
we get 0 (0 ) = 1 + — .
6y
Therefore, the particular solution is 
G(s;t) = 0{—   1} = 1 +   t 1 = 1+ 1
K '- O  ( - 4 - O r
H 5 -1 ) X (5-l)
5 -1  _ 1 -  ty (5 -1 ) + (5 -1 ) _ 5 -  ty(s - 1)
1 -  ty(s -1 ) 1 -  ty(s -1 ) 1 -  ty(s - 1)
Rearrange the terms, we get
G ( s -,t ) = s ( l ~ , r )  +  , r . 
l + ty — tys
We apply the properties of pgf to get the mean and variance of I.
If A > y , taking the first order derivative of Equation 3.2.4, we get
4 G _  . + l r ( l „ s ) e ^ + ( A s _ r ) ] .
ds A(l - s ) e (*-y)l + (A s -y )  (~l)[A(l -  s)e(X~r)t + (As ■
Let 5 = 1, we get
dG . y{- \ )e (X-r)t + A , ,  -  Ae(X~r)t + A
—  Li= ;— + ( * - r ) -----------------
=e(X~r)t.
d s 's=' ( A - y )  " ( - 1)[(z - y ) ] 2
_  y( - \ )e (l~y)t + A -  (~Ae(X~y)t + A) _  (A -  y)e(X~y)t 
( A - y )  ( A - y )
According to the properties of pgf, we get 
ds
Taking the second derivative of Equation 3.2.4, we get




d 2G _ ( - y e ^ y)t + A ) ( - A e ^ ‘ +A) ,+[ w +A] ~ ^ r)'
ds2 (-1 X A i l - s ^ - 7* + ( A s - y ) f  (-1 ) [ A ( l - s ) e ^ y)l+ ( A s - y ) f
- A e (X~y)t + A
+[ y( 1 -  s)e(l-y)t + (As -  y)](-2)
(-1 )[A(l -s )e(A-y)l + (As-y)]
d 2G x ( ~ y e ^ y)t+ A ) ( -A e ^ y)l+A) ir _ u „r)t , „ - A e ™ + A ,
ds2 u ‘ (-1 ) [ ( i - r )]2 W i - j O ]2
■AfiW' 7') ,+A
+2[(A-y)]-
P - y ) ] 3
= (-2)[-ye(A-y)t + A] ^  + A +2 ^  ** + A
(A -  y) (A -  y)2
= 2 ~Ae{X 7)t + 1 (i +
(2 - r )2
According to the properties of pgf, we get
Since <j2 = e [i 2 ] -  (^[/])2 = E[l{l - 1)] + £[/] -  (e [i ])2 , we get
cr2 =2 M l l - f - - ? .). [l + -  ^] + g(A- ^  -  [e^ - ^ ] 2
-  r) 2
- 2  ^  [i + -  A]+ ^ v  (-1- r ?
(A -  y)2 (A -  y f
ri _ (A-y)t \
= ̂ —  ----^ . [ ( A 2 + y 2) e ^ y)t +2 A -  2 A2] 3.2.7
( A - y ) 2
If A < y,  taking the first order derivative of Equation 3.2.5, we get
do  =  r - x e " - n  +  r (S - i  ) - ^ - r )elr-n‘ _
ds A ( s - l ) - ( A s - r y r~:‘>' ( - l ) ( M s - t ) - ( A s - r ) e " - " ] '
Let s = 1, we get
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dG\ -  Y ( A - y ) e ^ 1 (r_ „
d s ]°=' _ (A_ y)e(r-^  [_(A_ r)e ( ^ ]2 ^  Ae )
-  y - * * ™  i f l  _ .
- ( A - y y ^  [ ( A - y y ^ r  '
_ A e(7-Z)t - y  + j Z - A e ^ ' )  _  - y  + Z
(.X - r ) e (y-X)t ( Z - y ) e (r~X)t
So, E[l] = —  3.2.8
ds
Taking the second derivative of Equation 3.2.5 G (s;t), we get
—  = (-1) (r -  -  Ae'1--^) + r  -  ,
ds2 ( - t )U(s  -1)  -  (1, -  y)e(' - r" y  '
+ (_2) b U  -  0  - ( *  -  I * ™ ] ! *  -  f -»■] w  _
rf f£ , 1)( r - ^ (' - ,)- ) a - ^ - J)')  , r - ^ > '
<*! 1 l - ( z - r y r ' A):f  (-OK * - r ^ ’ ^ ’Y
+ ( - 2 )  >
^ { y - t e ^ W - X e ^ 1) ^ Z - y ) e ^ l ) t { Z - Z e ^ ‘] fy_„(
~ ( > [ W - r ^ r  + 2  [ W - r ^ r — (* _ *  5
+ 2  j * - * ™ ]  (, _ ^ . W)
[ ( A - y ) ^ - ^ ] 2 [ ( A - y y ^ ' ] 2
= 2 ^ ~ lg(r ^  [(2- -  Ae0'-**) -  (y -  ^ - A)()]
[ ( A - y y ^ ] *
[ X - A e {y- x)t] „  ,
— 2 -------------------- - (a — y )  9 ? Q
t ( A - y y ^ ] 2 3 -2 ' 9
Therefore, the variance of l(t) could be obtained as
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<72 = e [i 2]-{e [i ]}2 = e [i (i -  1)]+e [i ]-(£[/D 2
- { X - r ) + e ™  -  ( e ™ Y  3.2.10
[A -  Ae^ 1)(] „ u  (i-r)i 2
[ U - y ) ^ ' ]
From the above derivations, we can see the solution for the expectation of I  is the same 
when A * y ; that is,
I ( t )=e{X~r)t 3.2.11
But the solution for the variance o f / i s  different (See Equation 3.2.7 and 3.2.10).
/ \ s(\ — ty} ~h ty
When A = y ,  we haveG (s;t) = -----------------. Taking the first order derivative of
1 + ty -  tys
Equation 3.2.6, we get
dG 1 - y t  r . , - t y^-[ty + ( \- ty )s]-
ds 1 + yt-yts  (—1)(1 + t y - t y s ) 2
According to the property of pgf, the expectation of /  is
ds y t - y t - 1 (—1)[—1]
Taking the second derivative of Equation 3.2.7, we get
d 2G (l-yt)(-yt )  , r 1 - y t  , „ , , (-2 )(-yt) n
— r  =  — -— ' ■■■ + ty[ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7  +  (ty +  (1  -  yt)s) v A  . ]
ds ( - 1 ) ( 1  + yt-yts) (l + t y - t ys )  (l + t y - t y s f
Let s = 1, and according to the properties of pgf, we get
3.2.12
lv n ds2 i-i (-1) j [1]3-
: yt ~ (yt)2 + ty\\ + yt]=2yt
So the variance of I  could be
a 2 =E[l2}-(E[l]jl =E[l(l -l) \  + E[l]-(E[l])2 = 2y t  + 1 -1 2 = 2 y t  3.2.13
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We can see that when X = y , the expected number of infected machines is a 
constant as the initial value (See Equation 3.2.12), and the variance is a linear function of 
t.
3.2.2 Discussion about Stochastic Model 
and Deterministic Model





with initial conditions 7(0) = 1, S ( 0 ) - N - l ,  and M ( 0) = 0. 






Integrate both sides, we get f —z y  = [ (B/3-y)dt=>  In I(t) = (BJ3 - y ) t
J I(t) J
+ c
I  {t) = c,e
Use initial condition 7(0) = 1, we get cl = 1. So, the number of infected machines at time
t is
/ ( 0 = 3.2.15
Notice that if we assume the machines are fully connected (homogenous network), B 
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In [Wong 2004], the authors also give a deterministic model with immunization 
rate//. They call the model a “delayed immunization model” because immunization 
starts at a time moment when a certain proportion of hosts is infected. In their model, 
they use (N - 1) to represent the number of suspected nodes S(t) , but it should be ( N - I ~  
M) as given in the third equation of equation system 3.2.14 if  we consider the 
immunization from the healthy machine. The authors of [Wong 2004] ignored the 
number of immunized node M  when building the propagation model, but they did not 
specify this approximation. As [Wong 2004] stated, the number of immunized nodes and 
immunization rate is not easily observable, so we are not sure how much this 
approximation affects the model’s accuracy. We can only ignore the number of 
immunized machine M  and approximate the number of susceptible node S(t) as N - I  at 
the early stage of infection. That is why we assume I(t) « N  and M(t) « N  and get 
equation system 3.2.14. This assumption makes our model more applicable at the early 
stage of infection which includes both the starting stage and the fast-growing stage. This 
is also why the infected nodes grow exponentially as shown in Equation 3.2.15 instead of 
logistically as given in Chapter 2.
From Equation 3.2.15, we can see the number of infected machines we get from 
the deterministic model is exactly the same as the expected value of the stochastic model. 
The solutions agree with the theory that the stochastic model converges to the 
deterministic model when the population size is large [Andersson 2000].
From the stochastic model, we get both the expectation and variance of those 
values at any time t so that we can evaluate the best and the worst infection situation 
instead of a single number of infected machines. This evaluation could be important
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under certain circumstances. For example, when the infection rate and the recover rate 
are the same, the deterministic model shows the number of infected machines will not 
change and keep the same number as the initial state. The expected value of the stochastic 
model agrees with this result. But from the stochastic model, we also know that the 
variance is increasing as time goes on, and the number of infected machines could be 
infinite when t -»  oo.
3.3 Simulation Analysis
3.3.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation program is written using C++ compiled with Microsoft Visual 
C++ compiler under Windows XP environment. First, we randomly generate a simulated 
network with a given number of nodes, say N  nodes. Each node has r neighbors; r is a 
random number ranging from a to b, where a and b are given real numbers and
~ ~ ~  = B , so 0 < a <r <b < N . Then for each node g , we randomly choose r nodes out
of the N  nodes as its neighbor. When node h is selected as the neighbor of g , we also 
add g  as one of the neighbors of h . When we generate the neighbors for h , we will 
randomly choose ( r -  existing number of neighbors) as h ’s neighbors so that the total 
number of neighbors is still r . The average number of neighbors each node has is B.
Our infection simulation system is based on this randomly generated simulation 
network. The infection simulation system has three main procedures: infection, 
immunization, and recovering. When we start the simulation, one node will be randomly 
selected as the infected node. At each time step, all three events, infection, immunization 
and recovering, occur simultaneously. In the infection procedure, each infected machine
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infects its neighbors with rate /?. Similarly, the recovering procedure checks all infected 
nodes and tries to recover it with rate y, and the immunization procedure immunizes the 
susceptible machines with rate a .
3.3.2 The Random Number Generator
The random number generator provided by C++ library is a function rand( ). 
First, we need to initialize the random number generator by invoking srand{seed). Each 
initializing seed generates a different random number sequence. We get one random 
number from the sequence every time we call rand{ ) function. Those random numbers 
returned by calling rand( ) function range from 0 to RAND_MAX, where RAND_MAX 
is the maximum number a machine could generate. If we want uniform random numbers 
in [a, b], we can use the expression x -  a + (b -  a) rand( )/(RAND_MAX+1.0). But the 
problem with the random number generator is that the same seed always generates the 
same random sequence. The random number generator we use to generate the random 
network is provided by [Vetterling 2002], This generator avoids the problem we 
mentioned in rand( ) function given by the C++ library.
3.3.3 Simulation Results and Results Analysis
We run the infection simulation using different a, P  and y  values with a same 
network of 1,000 nodes. Figure 3.2 - Figure 3.5 plot the simulation results. Each curve of 
the plots is the average of 100 simulation runs.
Figure 3.2 plots the simulated number of infected machines with different 
parameters. In Figure 3.2, s, is the simulation result of no immunization from healthy 
machines, while s2 and sz show the simulation result when healthy machines are 
immunized before getting infected. The difference of s2 ands3 is that s2 is the
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simulation result when the infection rate is less than the recover rate; s3 is the simulation 
result when the infection rate is equal to the recover rate. The effect of immunization 
from healthy machines is not negligible since both s2 and s3 increase slower than 5,. We 
can sees, grows very slow since the infection rate is less than the recover rate.
Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5 give the simulation results and the expected 
values from INIM model. Figure 3.3 shows when X > y , i.e., infection rate is greater than 
the recover rate, the number of infected machine (s, is the simulation result, s2 is the 
expected value from INIM model ) is increasing as time goes on. Since healthy machines 
are immunized at the same time, the number of infected machines (s, and s2) do not 
grow tremendously even though the infection rate is greater than the recover rate. With 
the same immunization rate, when infection rate is equal to the recover rate (see Figure 
3.4), the expected number of infection shown by the model ( s 2) is always a constant as 
its initial value, which is 1. The simulation result (.s,) shows that the number of infected 
machines is increasing very slowly instead of at a constant. The simulation result is 
reasonable since our model shows the variance of the expected number of infection is 
increasing as a function of time t (see Equation 3.2.11). If the infection rate is less than 
the recover rate, the expected number of infection is zero (see s2 in Figure 3.6). The 
simulation result is not zero but very close to it (see s, in Figure 3.5).
In all three figures (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5), the simulation result 
( s 3) and theoretical result ( s4) o f the number of immunized machine grows much faster
than the number of infected machines. Also, we can see the theoretical results ( s4) fit the 
simulation results (53) better when infection just gets started. As time goes on, the
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difference between 53and s4 in all three figures (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5)
becomes bigger. This is because when we build the model, for simplicity we assume 
(i+m)/N -» 0 , but as time goes on, the number of immunized node is increasing, which 
makes (i+m)/N bigger and not ignorable. Therefore, we cannot directly apply this model 
to the whole life cycle of propagation of a malicious mobile code. In the future, we may 
use the exact value to build the stochastic model, but the solution of such a model will be 
much more difficult to obtain.
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Sj: a  = 0, p  = 0.01, y = 0.06 
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s3: a  = 0.02, p  = 0.01, y = 0.01
Figure 3.2: The simulation results of the number of infected 
machines with different parameters.
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s4 : Expected number of immunized machine
Figure 3.3: Simulation results and expected results when B * p > y
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5,: Simulated number of infected machine 
s2: Expected number of infected machine 
s3: Simulated number of immunized machine 
s4: Expected number of immunized machine
Figure 3.4: Simulation results and expected results when B * p  = y .
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s3: Simulated number of immunized machine 
s4: Expected number of immunized machine
Figure 3.5: Simulation results and expected results when b * p < y .
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3.4 Summary
This chapter introduces the stochastic propagation modeling of a malicious 
mobile code. Instead of modeling the propagation in a homogeneous network, we 
introduce a new factor B which represents the average number of neighbors a machine 
could have. We proposed an INIM model propagation model which considers the 
immunization from healthy and infected machines. We then use the probability 
generation function method to obtain the expectation and variance of the number of 
infected machines at time t. The simulation result showed that it is effective to use our 
model to predict the propagation of malicious mobile programs, especially at the early 
stage. Later on, we may use the exact value instead of the approximation that (i+m)/N 
—» 0 , so that the time parameter will have less effect on the prediction accuracy. Using 
the exact value of (i+m)/N makes the equation much more complex and the solution 
becomes very difficult to obtain. We may explore other methods to solve the model in the 
future.
In the INIM model we proposed in this chapter, the infection rate, immunization 
rate, and recover rate are constant. This model could be refined by extending these 
parameters to be time dependent.
This chapter discusses only the propagation of malicious self-replicating 
programs. Similar models could be built to model the propagation of useful information 
through the network. For example, we could model the propagation of benign mobile 
code, also called “good virus”. Analyzing the parameters that affect the propagation of 
benign mobile code could help us design future network that favors the propagation of 
such benign programs but throttle the propagation of those malicious programs.
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CHAPTER 4
EARLY DETECTION AND PROPAGATION MITIGATION 
OF MALICIOUS MOBILE CODE
This chapter proposes a control system to automatically detect and mitigate the 
propagation of malicious mobile programs such as computer worms at the early infection 
stage. The detection method is based on the observation that a worm always opens as 
many connections as possible in order to propagate as fast as possible. Therefore, we can 
monitor the connection rate to identify whether the status of a machine is normal or not. 
To develop the control system, we propose a detection algorithm, in which we provide an 
extension to the traditional statistical Process Control technique by introducing a sliding 
window. We apply sequential probability ration test to control the risk of the detection 
system so that the false positive rate is under certain threshold. We perform experiments 
to demonstrate the training phase and the testing phase of the control system using both 
real data and simulation data sets. Figure 4.1 shows the overall structure of the control 
system.
The experiment shows that by adjusting the tuning parameters appropriately, the 
control system can detect the propagation of malicious code with a zero false positive rate 
and less than 6% false negative rate, which asserts that our control system is effective.
54
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We also analyze the propagation behavior of a network when the control system is 
















The steps o f  malicious code propagation: (1) Initial infection; (2) Acquire target; (3) Transfer malicious 
code; (4) Execute malicious code. When abnormal behavior detected, the control system  w ill quarantine the 
infected host, therefore, no more machines w ill be infected.
Figure 4.1: The structure of the control system.
4.1 The Development of the Control System
Our control system includes a monitor and a controller. The monitor keeps track 
of the connection rate and reports it to the controller in real time. The controller makes 
the decision about whether or not there is an anomalous behavior, based on its knowledge 
from past experiences. This method belongs to behavior blocking, which is one of the 
anomaly detection methods. We extend the traditional Process Control technique to
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devise the detection algorithm for the controller. The general steps of building a control 
system are:
Step 1. Data collection: Collect a normal data set for training
Collect a normal data set for testing 
Collect an abnormal data set for testing 
Step 2. Assumption checking: Check the normality assumption of the training data 
Step 3. Training: Train the controller with the training data
Step 4. Testing: Test the control system using both the normal and the abnormal data.
Once these four steps are completed and the testing results are satisfying, the 
control system could be put into monitoring. The following subsections give the details of 
each step.
4.1.1 Data Collection
Since we are using the network connection behavior as an indicator of normal or 
anomalous behavior, we need to collect both normal and abnormal connection data, both 
from the same host. Under practical conditions, it is almost impossible to get connection 
data, both normal and abnormal, under the same circumstances, because we have no idea 
when there will be an outbreak of the malicious code. Fortunately, Goldsmith [Dave
2001] provided a connection request through TCP port 80 on July 18, 2001, the day when 
the network is normal (see Table 4.1), and on July 19, 2001, the day when Code Red 
broke out (see Table 4.2). The data was collected hourly.
The total connection rate Tc is defined as the total number o f TCP connections
that are built up in a given interval of time while the unique connection rate Uc is defined
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as the number of TCP connections built up to distinct destinations in a given interval of 
time. Thus, we have
Q
T =  — , where c is the number of connections in time t, 
t
uU = — where u is the unique number of connections in time t. 
t
For example, if a machine builds up j  connections to the same destination in a given time 
interval t, the total connection rate is j/t, while the unique connection rate is 1/i.
Table 4.1 gives the data from which we can calculate the average Uc, and it is 
about 17 connections per hour (cph) on July 18, 2001, while Table 2 gives the data from 
which we can calculate the average Uc, and it is about 37,549 cph on July 19, 2001. We 
plot the unique connection rate of both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 in Figure 4.3. Here, we 
choose the unique connection rate instead of the total connection rate because a worm 
program always tries to connect to as many new hosts as possible. Connecting to a new 
host means opening a new connection from a local host to a remote machine. If we use 
total connection rate, sometimes the rate is high simply because we need to build more 
connections to the same remote machine, but not because of the propagation of malicious 
code. For example, when we browse a web page, we build up connections to the remote 
server through TCP port 80 of the local machine. If the web page contains more than one 
object, each object needs a TCP connection in order to make sure that the whole web 
page is viewed properly. Web pages are formatted in a markup language called HTML 
(HyperText Markup Language). Each picture file or audio file or video file is embedded 
as an object in the HTML file of that web page. It is common for a web page to contain 
more than one object and very few web pages contain only text. So when we open a web
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page with many objects, the total connection rate becomes high. However, since all these 
connections are to the same remote machine, the unique connection rate will not change 
unless we open new web pages that connect to another remote server.
Figure 4.2 plots the raw data from Table 4.1. We can see that the variation of Tc
is much larger than Uc. Generally, we prefer sample data with smaller variations because
small variation means that the data is more stable and hence the control system will give 
fewer false alarms.
From Figure 4.3, we can see that Uc was small on July 18, 2001, when the
network was normal, then it grew tremendously when the malicious code started 
propagating at about 10:00 a.m. on July 19, 2001. Figure 4.3 reinforces the idea that we 
can detect the propagation of malicious code by monitoring the connection behavior, 
specifically, the unique connection behavior of a machine. We analyze the characteristics 
of the real data so that later on we can generate simulation data following the same 
distribution as that of the real data for training and testing purposes. Let Y be a discrete 
random variable that represents the number of the unique connections per hour, and 
y x, y 2, • • • y„ be n observations. The mean value of the normal sample y  is
4.1
n
The standard deviation of the sample s is calculated as
n
X O . - t )2 4.2
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We have 24 observations, so n = 24. Plugging the values of the unique connection rate 
from Table 4.1 into Equation 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, we get y  = 17.62 and s = 3.23.
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2 0 0  -r 
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1 2 0  -  
1 0 0  - -
T im e (UCT)
Figure 4.2: Total connection rate and unique connection rate 
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Figure 4.3: Normal and abnormal connection behavior. 
(UCT: United States Central Time).
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4.1.2 Assumption Checking
There are two reasons to check the normality assumption of the normal data:
(1) To know the distribution of the real data so that we can generate a simulation data 
with the same distribution as that of the real data, to train the control system, and
(2) To be able to apply the Process Control (or Quality Control) technique because the 
base data needs to satisfy the normality assumption.
-  Y "  y-We present the observed connection rate asy; = y  + en  where y = - •' is the
n
average of the sample data and s t is the error term. Thus, checking the normality 
assumption of y { becomes checking the normality assumption of the residual s (. We use
normal probability plot, which is a plot of standardized residual against their normal 
scores, to check the normality assumption of real data. Normal scores are the percentiles 
of the standard normal distribution. Statisticians [Dean 1999] found that if  the normality 
assumption holds, a plot of the q th smallest standardized residual against the 
100[(<y -  0.375)/(« + 0.25)] th percentile of the standard normal distribution for each 
<7 = 1,2, • • • n would show points roughly on a straight line through the origin with a slope 
equal to 1.0. These percentiles are also called Blom’s normal scores. Blom’s q th 
percentile is the value e  for which
P(Z < s q ) = (q -  0.375) /(« + 0.25)
where Z is a standard normal random variable. From the past experiences, statisticians 
conclude that normality plot is useful when sample size n is at least 15 [Dean 1999].
The normality plot generated by a SAS program is shown in Figure 4.4. In Figure 4.4, the 
Y-axis is the residual, and X-axis is Blom’s normal score sq . The points shown in Figure
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4.4 are roughly on a straight line through the origin, with slope equals to one. Although 
the line is not absolutely linear, it does not exhibit extremely heavy tails. Consequently, 
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A means that there is one observation corresponding to that particular point;
B means that there are two observations corresponding to that particular point, 
and so on.
Figure 4.4: Normality plot of normal connection data on July 18,2001.
4.1.3 Simulation Data Generation
The reason we use simulation data instead of collecting real data is that we can 
only collect normal connection behavior data, and it is almost impossible to get 
anomalous connection behavior data under the same circumstances, since the outbreak of 
malicious code does not happen very often and we have no idea when it will happen. The 
control system we propose is host-based, which means each user needs to install it on the 
local host to make it work. We cannot use the normal data of one host to train the control
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system and then put it to monitor the behavior of another host because the characteristics 
of the connection behavior are different for one host to another. The best we can do is to 
use the data provided by [Dave 2001], since this data is collected from the same host 
under the same circumstances.
To generate the simulation data with the normal distribution as that of the real 
data, we write a C++ program using the algorithm from Numerical Recipe [Vetterling
2002] which generates random numbers that follow a normal distribution. The function 
Normal ( )  can generate random numbers with distribution N (0 ,1). We know that if a
X  — iirandom variable X  has a distribution ofN(/u, a 2) , then Y = ------— has a distribution
a
o fN (0 ,1). So the random variable X can be written asX  = crY + /u. Therefore, we can 
generate sequences of random numbers with any normal distribution N ( ju ,a 2) using 
function the Normal ( ) that generates random numbers with a distribution ofN{Q,1). 
Using this method, we generated a training data set and a testing data set.
4.1.3.1 Training data generation
We generate 30 training samples to represent the normal connection behavior of 
one month, each day with 24 elements, with each element representing the unique 
Internet connection rate (Uc) per hour. The elements of the training data set have a 
normal distribution of 7v(l7, 32), which is the same as the distribution that is obtained 
from the real data we presented in Table 4.1.
4.1.3.2 Testing data generation
Every time we run the data generation program, the program generates a testing 
data set with 1,000 samples that includes 600 normal samples and 400 abnormal samples.
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Each sample has 24 randomly generated elements to represent the number of unique 
connections during each hour. For a better description, we number the samples from 0 to 
999.
Sample 0-sample 599 simulate the normal connection behavior of a host.
The elements of sample 0-sample 199 follow the distribution of iv(l7, 32).
To simulate a normal gradual increase of process mean,
the elements of sample 200-sample 249 follow iv(l 8.5, 32), 
the elements of sample 250-sample 399 follow iv(20, 32), 
the elements of samples 400-sample 449 follow tV(21.5, 32), and
the elements of samples 450-sample 599 follow n (23, 32).
Sample 600-sample 999 simulate the abnormal connection behavior of a host. To 
simulate the change of the connection rate, in each of the abnormal samples, the first 8 
elements still follow the distribution of normal connection behavior at tv(23, 32), and 
the rest of the elements have abnormal connection rates. To make the sample closer to 
real data, the value of the sample elements increase a little bit after the eighth element, 
and the value of the later elements keep increasing afterwards (as Figure 4.3 shows). To 
simulate the stealthy worm whose connection rate generally does not increase to an 
obvious high level, we generate random numbers from 29 to 39 as the abnormal elements 
of sample 600-sample 799. To simulate the connection behavior of most current worms,
i.e., their attempt to connect to as many machines as possible, we generate random 
numbers from 40 to 100 as the abnormal elements of sample 800-sample 999. So in the 
simulation data, even the highest connection rate (which is 100) is much less than the
connection rate of the real data (which is 1281, at 9 am, when the malicious code broke
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out) as seen in Table 4.2. But the connection rate is still high enough to demonstrate the 
efficiency of our control system. For each abnormal sample, when we generate the 
random numbers as abnormal elements, we sort them from small to large, so that each 
sample is similar to the real data shown in Table 4.2.
This kind of simulation is rough, but this is the best we can do based on the observation 
of connection behavior and the real data that we have. Figure 4.5 shows the overall 
distribution of the testing data sets by calculating the average of every 50 samples 
sequentially.
iO u u m l Data
150 250 350 450 950
Sam ples
Figure 4.5: Distribution of testing data.
4.1.4 Detection Algorithm and Its 
Statistical Analysis
Traditional Process Control technique includes two stages. Stage one is called the 
Base Period during which the base data is collected and the normality assumption of the
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base data is checked as explained in Section 4.1.2. If the assumption is satisfied, we 
estimate the mean and variance and then calculate the control limit (CL) from the mean 
( / / )  and variance ( cr ) as
CL = fi ± A a
where A is a parameter determined by the control criteria. A bigger A makes the control 
limit wider. Consequently, the probability of making a type I error is smaller, but the
r
probability of making a Type II error is greater.
Stage two is called the Monitoring Stage during which each new sample is 
collected and identified to see whether it is within the control limit or not. If the sample is 
beyond the control limit, a violation is detected. Figure 4.6 shows the procedure of the 
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Figure 4.6: Traditional process control chart.
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The traditional Process Control procedure makes the operation simple, but it is 
less adaptive to the changes developing in the process mean. Therefore, we extend the 
traditional Process Control technique by adding a sliding window with size w so that the 
base data always includes the most recent w observations. Whenever / new observations 
are collected, we move the window forward to include these/  observations but still keep 
the size of the window the same. This way, the control system learns any change of the 
connection behavior and adapts to it by itself, and the false alarm rate is therefore 
reduced; /  represents the updating frequency of the control limit. If / i s  set to be 1, the 
control limit is updated once a new observation is collected. High updating frequency 
(i.e. low value off )  adds unnecessary computation complexity to the system, while low 
updating frequency (i.e. high value off )  may lower the detection accuracy. Choosing an 
optimal frequency (f) is discussed in the experiment section.
Figure 4.7 gives the framework of building a control system for a given host using 
the extended Process Control technique. Figure 4.8 presents the monitoring procedure.
Algorithm: Early detection and propagation mitigation of malicious mobile code. 
Procedure 1: Early Detection ( )
Initialize w and/;  initialize i=0
1. Collect r samples as base data;
2. Check the normality assumption of base data.
3. If normality assumption is satisfied, continue to 4, otherwise stop.
4. Estimate mean and variance of base data;
5. Calculate the upper control limits;
6. Set sliding window with the most w samples of the base data.
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If (z equals f)
{
Let i=0;
Move the sliding window forward so that the base data includes the most recent 
/  observations;
Update mean, variance, and upper control limits;




Figure 4.7: Early detection and propagation mitigation algorithm.
Procedure 2: Monitoring ( )
Begin
Collect new connection rate 
Check the control limit 
{
If new observation is within control limit, back to while loop of Procedure 1. 
Otherwise, limit the outgoing connection and investigate the system
}
End.
Figure 4.8: Monitoring algorithm.
Figure 4.9 shows the control system using sliding window. We can see that the 
window with size w keeps moving forward as the monitoring period goes on. Each time 
when the sliding window has been moved forward, the mean and variance of the unique 
connection rate are updated.
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S t e p  3 :  Estimate N ( f t  „ , a  , )
4 :  Create sliding window 
‘Wn’ over base data
cr
S t e p  6 :  Update W„ using the k- 
shifl parameter to generate Wx~
UCL,= rt +3q
S t e p  7: Update N ( f t , ,  cj-,)
e p  8 :  Update upper control 
limit ‘UCLV to ‘UCL,’.
At+*
Time in hours
W0, Wl etc., are the sliding windows. Each time when /  new observations are collected, the sliding 
window moves forward, and the upper control limit (UCL) is updated.
Figure 4.9: Flow chart of the detection algorithm.
4.1.4.1 Confidence interval for mean u
Let X  be the mean of a random sample of size n from a normal distribution with 
mean ju and standard deviation s, the random variable
T = ^X JL  4 3
s H n
has t distribution with n -1  degrees of freedom. The area between - t ajln_ 5 and ta/2 is
( I - a )  (area a  12 lies in each tail), so probability
< T  <?a/2,»-l) = 1- «  4.4
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Consequently, the 100(1 - a ) %  confidence interval for n  is
( - ^  U / 2 , n - l  I— ’ U / 2 , n - l  i— ) •
yin yin
4.5
Moreover, when the area of the upper tail is a  , then probability
P {T < ta^ )  = \ - a . 4.6
So the upper confidence bound for /j. is
4.7
If we let a  be 0.01, using Equation 4.5, the confidence interval for mean fj. of normal 
unique connection rate is obtained as
Simplifying it, we get the 99% confidence interval for mean // as (15.77, 19.47), which 
means the probability that the mean value of the normal unique connection rate lies in the 
interval (15.77, 19.47) is 99%. Using Equation 4.7, the 99% upper confidence bound for 
H is obtained as 19.27, which means the probability that the mean value of the normal 
unique connection rate is less than 19.27 is 99%.
4.1.4.2 Upper control limit
In the industry, if the random sample of a monitored process falls in the area of 
ju ± 3 a , we believe that the process is under control. In our case, we assume that the 
mean ju and standard deviation cr are known, and their values are 17.62 and 3.23, 
respectively. Hence, the control limit for the control system is 17.62 ± 3 x 3.23. Since we 
know that when a malicious code propagates, it always increases the unique connection
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rate, then we only need to be concerned about the upper control limit. Therefore, when a 
random sample falls beyond ju + 3a  =27.31, an out of control signal will be given.
4.1.4.3 Level of significance
Let random variable Y denote the unique connection rate. It has normal 
distribution with mean ft and variance a . Yl ,Y2,Y3,---,Yn are the random samples of the
unique connection rate. The monitoring period includes a hypothesis test at the given 
significant level a  , that is:
Null hypothesis
H 0 : Yt =fi
Against alternative hypothesis
Hr- r ,> f i
where ft is the estimated mean value using the connection data in the sliding window. 
The Test statistic TS is obtained as
TS = 4.8
which has a Z distribution, so this hypothesis test is also called a Z test.
The rejection region for level a  test is TS > za , where za is defined as the point
such that P(Z > za) = a ;  za is also called the critical value. An out-of-control signal 
occurs whenever a point falls in the rejection region, and an investigation for possible 
reasons should be initiated; a  is the probability that we reject H 0 when H 0 is true,
which means we identify a connection behavior to be an anomalous behavior since it is 
beyond the control limit when it actually is normal.
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Traditionally, the control limit is defined as /) ± 3cr . But since malicious programs 
only increase but never decrease the connection rate, we are only concerned with the 
upper limit, which is defined as ju + 3 a , and
Hence, the significance level a  is 0.0013, which implies that the probability a 
normal connection rate falls beyond the UCL is 0.13%.
4.1.4.4 P-value of the hypothesis test
The P -value is the smallest level of significance at which H 0 would be rejected
when a specified test procedure is based on a given data set. If the significance level is 
greater than P  -value, the null hypothesis will be rejected; otherwise, the null hypothesis 
will be accepted. The P  -value of a hypothesis test lets us know whether the null 
hypothesis is barely rejected or barely accepted by comparing the significance level 
a  and the P  -value. Figure 4.10 illustrates the P-value in a Z test where the P-value is 
greater than significance level a  . So, TS does not lie in the rejection region and the null 
hypothesis will not be rejected in the example given in Figure 4.10.




Figure 4.10: The P-Value of a Z  test (TS: Test Statistic).
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The P-value of a Z test can be obtained by checking a standard normal 
probability table. For example, if  the connection rate is 24, using Equation 4.8, the test 
statistic is obtained as
r a = 24- 17-65= 1.966.
3.23
From the standard normal probability table, we approximately get
P (Z >  1.966) = 0.0247.
Hence, the P-value is 0.0247. Since the significance level we set is 0.0013, which is 
much less than 0.0247, we can strongly conclude that the null hypothesis H 0 should not 
be rejected.
4.1.4.5 Average run length
When a process is in control, we should observe many samples before we come 
across one sample that is beyond the control limit (a false alarm). Define a random 
variable S, such that S  = the first i for which Y{ falls outside the control limit.
If  we think of each sample as a trial and an out-of-control sample as a success, then S is 
the number of trials necessary to observe a success. The expectation of S (E(S)) is called 
the Average Run Length (ARL), and ARL for a false alarm to appear could be obtained as
ARL = E ( S ) = - .  4.9
a
One reason why network users do not want to enable the intrusion detection systems is 
that the intrusion detection systems may give off false alarms and these false alarms are 
irritating to most people. Therefore, we need to make the false alarm rate as low as 
possible, i.e., to make the ARL value as large as possible.
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For example, if  the significance level of the hypothesis test is set at a  =0.005, i.e., we 
take Y + 2.575a  as the upper control limit, then the false alarm rate is 0.5%. By 
calculating, we get
ARL = E(S)=  — = —-— =200, 
a  0.005
which means when the process is under control, one false alarm could happen for every 
200 observations.
The control system we designed takes Y + 3& as the upper control limit; 
therefore, the hypothesis test is at significance level a  =0.0013. Hence, we could get the 
Average Run Length as
ARL = E(S) = —= — -— =769.23, 
a  0.0013
which means when the process is under control, at the utmost, one false alarm could 
happen for every 769 observations if we set the upper control limit of the connection rate 
at 27.31.
4.2 Experiments
This section presents the details of building a control system using the simulation 
data. The purpose of the experiments is:
• To demonstrate the training process and the testing process of the control 
system.
• To test the reliability and the adaptability of the control system.
• To give a quantitative evaluation of how sliding window improves the 
performance.
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• To evaluate the effect of tuning parameters like, the sliding window size (w) 
and the updating frequency (/).
4.2.1 Training
Before we train the control system, we should check whether or not the training 
data follows normal distribution. Since we already checked the normality assumption of 
the real data and the simulation data is generated following the same distribution as that 
of the real data, we know that the training data also satisfies the normality assumption. So 
we feed the training data to the controller and the controller learns the mean, variance, 
and upper control limit from it.
4.2.2 Testing
We build two controllers: controller one uses the traditional Process Control
technique; controller two uses the extended Process Control technique with the sliding
window. We perform experiments using both controllers. This section shows the
reliability of the control system and the performance of each controller. We also discuss
the choice of the optimal tuning parameters by testing their effects.
4.2.2.1 Performance analysis of the 
control system
The performance of the control system can be analyzed by comparing the false 
negative and the false positive rates of the two controllers (one using the traditional 
Process Control and the other using the extended Process Control).
False Negative:
We first train the two controllers with the training data set. Then we run the controller 
program 100 times to test the reliability, each time with a different testing data set. Both
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controllers detect all anomaly samples when malicious code starts spreading, so the false 
negative rate of both of them is zero.
False Positive:
Figure 4.11 plots the false positive rate of each experiment run. The false positive rate of 
controller one is about 30% to 35% and the false positive rate of controller two is lower 
than six percent. Therefore, we can demonstrate that the false positive rate is greatly 
reduced when we apply the sliding window.
From Figure 4.11, we can also see that the performance of controller two is quite 
reliable. It has an average false positive rate of 4.35% and no false positive rate higher 
than 6% in any single run. Therefore, we conclude that the control system using the 
extended Process Control technique is effective in detecting the propagation behavior of 
malicious codes. The sliding window plays an important role in reducing the false 
positive rate when the process behavior changes. The effectiveness of the extended 
Process Control can be attributed to this introduction of a sliding window, which causes 
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Figure 4.11: Reliability of the control system applying traditional 
and extended Process Control technique (w = 6 0 0 ,/ = 20).
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4.2.2.2 The effect of sliding window w
If the size of the sliding window w is too small, it will result in an inadequacy of 
the model to properly represent the system dynamics, and will therefore lead to a poor 
general performance. Conversely, if the window is too larger then the computational 
complexity is unnecessarily increased. To choose an optimal value for w, we perform an 
experiment with different sizes of the sliding window. For each size of the sliding 
window, we run the experiment ten times and get the average false negative rate and the 
false positive rate from these ten runs. Figure 4.12 and Figured 4.13 plot the average false 
negative rate and false positive rate respectively when the window size varies from 20 to 
720.
Figure 4.12 shows that when w increases, the false negative rate decreases. 
The control system gets zero false negative rate when w is greater than 480. Figured 4.13 
shows that when w is too small, the false positive rate is high, but it converges quickly to 
about 6% when w increases above 40. The overall performance analysis of the control 
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Figure 4.12: False negative rate of the control system when the size of 
sliding window w  varies (The value of f  is fixed at 1/ 20).
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Figure 4.13: False positive rate of the control system when the size of 
Sliding window w varies (The value of f  is fixed at 1/ 20).
4.2.2.3 The effect of updating frequency f
Let the number of new observations in the sliding window to be os , then the
updating frequency /  is defined as /  = — . When /  is larger, the control system moves
the sliding window more frequently. Since the control rules are updated each time the 
sliding window is moved forward, the computation complexity is increased. If /  is too 
small, the control system cannot catch the dynamic change of the connection behavior in 
real time. Hence, the performance of the control system is degraded.
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 plot the average false positive rate and false negative 
rate respectively when /  varies. Figure 4.14 shows that the false negative rate becomes 
zero when 1/ f >  16. Figure 4.15 shows that the false positive rate is stabilized when 
/  < 26 but increased dramatically when l / / >  26. Overall, the optimal/ value is between
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1/16 and 1/26. The overall performance analysis of the control system we presented in 






Figure 4.14: False negative rate when/ varies 









Figure 4.15: False positive rate when/ varies 
(The value of w is fixed at 600).
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4.3 Risk Analysis of the Control System
All intrusion detection systems have a false positive rate. Therefore, there is 
always a probability that a detection system detects a propagation that does not exist at 
all. In statistics, this is also called producer’s risk. For an intrusion detection system, it is 
extremely important to reduce the producer’s risk because it may lead to a complete 
rejection of usage. This section analyzes producer’s risk and introduced a novel idea of 
using Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to control the risk.
4.3.1 Risk Analysis Using SPRT
Let the inspection result of the ith unit be denoted as X t, then X t=\ if  there is 
malicious code propagation detected; X t = 0 otherwise.
Let /  represents the probability function of A , then 
f ( \ , p )  = p  and f (0,p)  = I - p .
Here, p  is interpreted as the false positive rate, that is, the probability of detecting a 
malicious behavior of a healthy machine.
To test the hypothesis of H 0 : p  = p 0 against H x \ p  = p x, let p 0m and p lm be the
probability of getting d m false detection in the sample (X l, X 2, - - , X m) o f  size m under 
H 0 and H ] , respectively. Then the Likelihood Ration
4 . 10
n m rt \ m~“m
Pom U f ( Xi, P o ) P  0 t 1 Po)
1=1
( 1 A
log An = dm log— + ( m - J m)lOg
P o i - P o
4 .ll
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The SPRT for a hypothesis H 0 : p  = p 0 against its alternative H x : p  = p x is
carried as follows:
If log Am > A , reject H 0 and terminate the process.
If logAm < B , accept H 0 and terminate the process.
If B < logAm< A ,  collect observation X  m+x, calculate \ogAm+x and compare the 
value of log/Lm+1 with A and B again.
Where A and B are constants defined as
. , 1 - p  _  . PA = log — and B = log———
a  I - a
4.12
If we write
P o  . V l ~ P o )
4.13
then Equation 4.11 becomes
l°gAm = d mg x - ( t n - d m )g 4.14
So, we reject H 0 if
g x + g 2 g l + g 2
4.15
We accept H 0 if
d mg x - { m - d m) g 2 < B  = >  d m < — - —  +  m — g -2 - -
gx g 2 g x + g 2
4.16
Then, the rejection line Lx is
d m = h  i +  sm 4.17
and the acceptance line L2 is
d m =h7 + smm l 4. 18
where hx = ---------- , h2 = -----------, and s = ------ —
g x + g  2 g x + g 2 g x + g 2
4.19
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From Equation 4.17 and Equation 4. 18, we can see hx and h2 are the interception of line 
Z, and line L2 on the d m axis respectively, while s is the slope of both lines. Below is 
the Risk Control Algorithm using line Lx, L2 and point (m,dm ) . And Figure 4.16 is the 
control chart based on the risk control algorithm.
Risk Control Algorithm
1) Determine p 0, p x, a  , /?;
2) Calculate A and B using Equation 4.12; Calculate gx and g 2 using Equation 4.13;
3) Get the value of hx, h2 and s using Equation 4.19;
4) Draw rejection line Lx and acceptance line Z2 using 5 as slope and hx, h2 as 
interception for Lx and Z2 respectively as Figure 4.16 shows;
5) Get the mth sample, count dm;
6) Plot point (m, dm );






LjZ dm = h} 
(Acceptance Kcgion)
Figure 4.16: Risk control chart. If point (m,dm) lies below Z2, accept H 0; 
if it lies above Z,, reject H 0; otherwise, keep sampling.
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4.3.2 Examples of Risk Control Using SPRT
Let the false positive rate be p 0, since we are using a one-sided control process
with 3cr as the control limit, />o=0.001. To test the hypothesis that the false positive rate 
is p Q, we have
H 0 :p  = p 0 against H x: p  = p x 
Letp x = 0.002, a  -  0.01, /? = 0.05, we get




, 0.002 „ . . .g x = log--------= 0.301
1 0.001
. 1-0.002 .g 7 = -  log------------- = 4.349x10
2 1-0.0013
hx =— - — =6.563 
g l + g 2
h2 = — - — =- 4.303 
gx+gl
s=  8 2  = 0.0014.
gl+g2
Therefore, the rejection line Lx is: dr = 6.563 + 0.0014/w; the acceptance line L2 is
da =-4.303 + 0.0014w.
Table 4.3 lists two examples of using SPRT to control the risk of false positive. 
We plot the acceptance example on Figure 4.17. From Figure 4.17, we can see that points 
lies in the middle until m = 3800.1ies acceptance region when, which means we should 
Haccept hypothesis 0. In other words, the false positive rate is the same as we expected 
from the theory. We also take one sample from the stealthy malicious code whose 
propagation is hard to observe because of the low connection rate. Using the detection
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result of the stealthy malicious code, the sequential ratio test is processed as Table 4.3 
Example 2 shows. Plot Example 2 on Figure 4.18, we can see when m = 760, the point
Hlies in the rejection region, which means 0 is rejected and we should accept the 
alternative. Therefore, we should adjust the control limit so that the false positive rate 
could be reduced to what we expected.
Table 4.3: Risk analysis using SPRT
Example 1: An Acceptance Example Example 2: A Rejection Example
M d m dm d.
0 0 -4.303 6.563
1 0 -43016 65644
10 0 -4.289 6577
100 0 -4.163 01703
1000 0 -2J903 7-963
1500 1 -2203 6663
2000 1 -1.503 9J363
3000 1 -0.103 10.763
3000 1 0.737 11.603
3700 1 0.877 11.743
3000 1 1J017 11-883
n dm dM d.
0 0 -4.303 6563
1 0 -43016 65644
10 0 -4.289 6577
100 1 -4.163 01703
200 2 -4.023 6.843
300 3 -3883 6983
400 3 -3.743 7.123
500 4 -3.003 7263
600 5 -3463 7.403
700 7 -3323 7.543
700 8 -3183 7.683
(Rejectum Segjon)
X,: <7, =6_5ti3-t-0.0014 m
Cnrtmne
(0,1000) (1,1500) 0,2500) 0,3500) 0,3100)
L,: d a = -4 303 +0 0014 m  
(AaxptBnx Region)
Figure 4.17: An acceptance example of risk control (Since point (1,3800) 
falls in the acceptance region, we should accept the hull hypothesis).




d T =  6.563+0JMI14»i (5.6009




i j : rf„— 4_303+0JM14xi
(Acceptance Ecgjun)
Figure 4.18: A rejection example of risk control (Since point (8, 760) 
falls in the rejection region, we should reject the hull hypothesis).
4.4 Network Performance Analysis
This section analyzes the propagation behavior of malicious code when the control 
system applied. We compare the performance of a network when different number of 
machines applied the control system. The performance is evaluated by the mathematical 
propagation models. We extend the propagation models introduced in Chapter 2 by 
introducing a new factor, which we will give the detail in the following section. We also 
design a serial of propagation simulations in a network with control system. The 
simulation result is consistent with the theoretical result, which implies the success of the 
control system. The notation we use in this section follows the same definition given in 
Chapter 2.
4.4.1 Extended SI Model
In Chapter 2, we have presented the standard SI model that assumes the 
population is homogeneously mixed, which is not true in the real world. In Chapter 3, we 
have introduced a new factor B, the average number of contactors an individual has in a
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given time period, into the stochastic propagation model. Here, we will present the
deterministic SI model with factor B.
Assuming we have only one machine infected at time zero, the total number of
infected individuals can be modeled as:
dlif) = B N  -  l i t)  ^  with = 1 
dt N  w
Let i = I / N  and k = J3-B, dividing both sides of Equation 4 .2 0  by N, we get
di(t)/dt = £ (1  -  i(t))i(t) 4 .2 1
The solution of the general epidemic model given as Equation 4 .2 1  is
ekt1(0 = f 77 4 .2 2
N - l  + ekl
where k  is the infection rate. Infection rate is the number of machines that could be
infected by one infectious machine in one time unit.
4.4.1.1 Fitting the observed data with 
extended SI model
The computer worm Code Red exploits the buffer-overflow vulnerability in 
Microsoft’s IIS web server [Moore 2 0 0 2 ] .  The propagation of Code Red is noticed at 
about 1 0 : 0 0  am (central time) on July 1 9 . The propagation stops at 1 2 : 0 0  midnight by the 
designing of Code Red. It infected more than 3 5 9 ,0 0 0  machines during approximately 13  
hours of propagation [Moore 2 0 0 2 ]  [Caida 2 0 0 1 ] .  Code Red randomly generates 1 0 0  
threads; each thread randomly chooses one IP address and connects to the machines with 
corresponding IP addresses through port 8 0  [Zou 2 0 0 2 ] ,  It installs the mechanism for 
remote, administrator-level access to the infected machine so that the machine could be
used to execute any code [Moore 2 0 0 2 ] .  Therefore, it is highly dangerous. Figure 4 .1 9
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shows the observed Code Red propagation. The infection came to saturating around 
20:00, and the propagation stops at 12:00 midnight, so the number of infected host in 
Figure 4.19 does not change after 12:00 midnight.
Assume that the total number of vulnerable hosts is 400,000. If we fit the model 
with k = 0.8, we get the theoretical result o f Code Red propagation in Figure 4.20.. 
Compare Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20, we conclude that even the simple SI epidemic 
model provides a reasonably good approximation of malicious mobile code propagation. 
The observed value does not grow as smooth as the theoretical model because the 
network bandwidth is exhausted by the malicious code so that it cannot connect and 
infect the target machine as it does at the early infection stage.
4 0 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 0
3  £00000  -
150000
100000
5 0 0 0 0
Code Red Norm - infected hosts
0 0 : 0 0 0 4 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0
0 7 / 1 9
1 2 : 0 0  1 6 : 0 0  
time <UTC>
0 0 : 0 8  
0 7 / 2 0
0 4 : 0 0
Figure 4.19: Observed Code Red propagation (From www.Caida.orgl.











Figure 4.20: Theoretical result of Code Red propagation.
4.4.2 Propagation Modeling with 
Control System
As we discussed in Chapter 2, when propagation starts, the speed is slow at the 
very beginning, then it comes to the fast spreading stage during which the number of 
infected nodes grows tremendously, and finally the infection speed slows down since 
very few susceptible nodes are still available. At the first and the second stages, the 
number of infected nodes grows almost exponentially. If all hosts use the control system, 
the infection speed could be greatly reduced and the infection may never get to the third 
stage because countermeasures taken by humans could immunize nodes when they are 
healthy. In the following subsection, we present the propagation model with the control 
system and give a quantitative evaluation of the effects of the control system. We do not 
consider immunization and recover in this model.
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When a malicious code detection system is applied in a network, a healthy host 
might be flagged as infected (False Positive), and an infected host might not be detected 
and therefore declared as healthy (False Negative) (See Figure 4.21). A false positive will 
not affect the propagation of a malicious code, so we do not need to consider it in the 
propagation model. Suppose p  percent of the hosts installed the control system and the 
detection rate of the control system is d. We know that the false negative rate is 1 -  d .
Figure 4.21: State transition of extended SI model with detection system.
When a machine is detected with malicious code, its connection rate is limited. 
Ignoring the one unit detection delay, we have
where /, = I  ■ p - d , I 2 = I  • (l -  p)+1  • p - ( l - d ) ; B l is the limited number of contactors a 
machine could have when infection is detected; B2 is the number of contactors a machine 
could have when infection is not detected, and B2 »  Bx.
S: Susceptible I: infected
FP: False positive FN: false negative
4.23
Let kx = /?•#, ,  k2 - /3 - B 2, i = I  I N , / , = / , /  N , i2 = I 2 1 N , then from Equation 4.23,
we obtain
di I dt = k , (1 — i)/j +k2( 1 — i)i2 4.24
The solution of Equation 4.24 is
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Figure 4.22 shows the infection delay when a different percentage of hosts install 
the control system. Obviously, the more hosts installing the control system, the better the 
results are. If only 20% of the hosts adopt the control system, the overall effect is very 




T im e  Unit
Figure 4.22: Infection evolution with different p  values 
(N = 10,000, j3 = 0.8, d  = 1.0).
4.4.3 Simulation
This section conducts simulation experiments to verify the prediction of the 
spreading speed and scale given by the models. We first simulate a simple epidemic 
propagation model, and then we simulate the propagation model with the control system.
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4.4.3.1 Simulation setup
Our simulation program includes a network generator and an infection process. 
Every time we run the simulation, the network generator will generate a random network 
with 5,000 nodes. Each node has a switch. If the switch is on, the control system is turned 
on; otherwise, the control system is off. The number of neighbors has a uniform 
distribution of (1, 20). The neighbors of each node are randomly generated. Neighbors of 
a given node are defined as the nodes that the given node will contact in an infection 
process. Figure 4.23 gives the general structure of each node in C++ style. Once node j  is 
randomly chosen as the neighbor of node i, we also add node i as node f  s neighbor.
General Structure of Each Node in the Random Network
struct node {
// declare the Unique ID of the node 
int id;
//the number of neighbors allows; this number has uniform distribution 
int egNo;
//node status; 1 = healthy; 0 = infected; -1 = immunized 
int status;
// switch of the control system,
bool control; // control=l, control system on; control = 0, no control system
//to specify the node is infected or not in current dt or before 
bool newlnf;
// store the id of its neighbors 
int array nborID[ ];
// the total number of neighbors 
int nborNo;
} End node
Figure 4.23: General structure of each node.
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One node is randomly selected as the initially infected node. We use time step to 
represent the time unit dt in the propagation models. During each time step, each infected 
node tries to infect its neighbors with pair wise infection rate (3.
4.4.3.2 Propagation simulation of SI model
To simulate the simple epidemic model without the control system, we just turn 
off the switch. We run the simulation 100 times. Figure 4.24 plots the infection process 
by taking the average of all simulation runs. The simulation is a little slower than the 
theoretical model at the early infection stage. Overall, the simulation results are close to 
the theoretical results, so we conclude that simple epidemic model given by Equation 
4.20 matches the general propagation phenomena. Since the real data have validated the 
accuracy of the theoretical model as shown in Section 4.4.1, and the simulation result is 
close to the theoretical model, we conclude that the simulation does approximate the real 
infection phenomenon. Therefore, we are confident that our further simulations 
approximate the real propagation scenarios.




Figure 4.24: Simulation results and theoretical results of 
SI model ( k = 0.4, p  = 0).
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4.4.3.3 Propagation simulation 
with control system
We simulate four cases of worm propagation with control system. In each case, 
the percentage of nodes with control system on is different. Every time we run the 
infection simulation, we randomly choose p percent of the nodes with control system 
turned on. During propagation, an infected node tries to infect its neighbors with a lower 
infection rate (k value) if  the switch is on; otherwise, we keep using the same infection 
rate (k value) as in Section 4.4.3.2. We run the simulation 100 times for each case. Table
4.4 shows the average time units needed to infect certain percentage of the network nodes 
under different cases.
Table 4.4: Simulation results of four different p  values
Case No. P T1 T2
1 20% 5.5 68.7
2 50% 9.9 124.9
3 80% 12.1 161.4
4 90% 25.2 192.4
p  is the percentage of hosts with control system on.
T1 is the time steps needed to infect half of the nodes. 
T2 is the time steps needed to infect all the nodes.
Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.26 show the infection evolution when p  = 0.8 and 
p  = 0.9, respectively. We also plot the infection results of the theoretical model. We can 
see the theoretical results match the simulation results. Furthermore, the average time 
needed to infect the population decreases dramatically when increased from 0.8 to 0.9.
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From Table 4.4, we know it takes about 12 time steps to infect half o f the nodes when 
p  = 0.8, but 25 time steps when p  = 0.9.
Table 4.4, Figure 4.25, and Figure 4.26 illustrate that when p is less than 20%, the 
propagation limiting effect is very small, but when p is more than 50%, the slowing down 
effect is obvious. In summary, both simulation and theoretical model show the 
effectiveness of applying the control system. To fight the malicious mobile programs 
efficiently and to minimize the overall damages, we should not just think about protecting 
ourselves from the outside world, or just depend on a few hosts to do the good deeds. In 
order to get the satisfactory result of propagation restriction, we need to have at least 50% 
of the hosts of an organization or community to install the control system. This is also the 
limitation of the control system.





t i m e  s t e p
Figure 4.25: Simulation result and theoretical result of malicious code 
propagation when p  = 0.8 ( N=  5000).
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Figure 4.26: Simulation result and theoretical result of malicious 
code propagation when p  = 0.9 (N  = 5000).
4.4.4 Conclusion
In this section, we modify the standard SI model by introducing a new factor B. 
We present the propagation models with and without the control system. We fit the 
observed Code Red propagation data into the theoretical model and the result is 
satisfactory. The simulation of Code Red propagation is close to the observed data. 
Therefore, we conclude that the propagation simulation approximates the real 
propagation of malicious mobile code, and the conclusions we draw from the simulation 
experiments are reasonable.
The mathematical analysis of modified SI models (Equation 4.20) and the model 
with control system (Equation 4.23) shows that the control system helps reducing the 
spread of malicious code. The propagation scale is reduced more when more other hosts
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are using the control system. Further simulation verifies the prediction of the number of 
infected hosts using the theoretical models.
4.5 Discussion
The proposed control system is host-based and it is adaptive to the characteristics 
of the local host. Once installed, it leams the local host’s connection behavior and blocks 
the anomalous behavior based on the host’s own normal behavior. Besides, when the 
host’s behavior changes, the detection system leams the changes and makes the 
corresponding changes in its operating parameters, and thus ensures that the false alarm 
rate is reduced.
4.5.1 Detection Delay
The detection delay of the control system depends on the time interval between 
two observations. In this experiment, since the unique connection rate data is recorded 
per hour, the detection delay is one hour. However, when we put the system into real use, 
the one-hour monitoring interval is too long when malicious code really exists. We 
should set the monitor interval smaller: for instance, one minute, or even one second 
depending on the security requirement. In the experiment, we use one-hour interval just 
because the real data we have is collected per hour. Besides, the main purpose of the 
experiment is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the control system.
4.5.2 The Advantages of the Control System
Normally, the side effect of high false positive rates in intrusion detection systems 
is that when an anomaly is detected, the machine is isolated from the network by the 
intrusion detection system. This may lead to the annoyance of a network user whose 
work will be hampered and ultimately may cause the user to discard the intrusion
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detection system. In order to decrease this side effect, the control system does not isolate 
the machine from the network when anomaly is detected but just limits the connection 
rate to a lower level. The advantage of doing this is that a user will not get annoyed and 
discard the control system because of the false alarms. The propagation of malicious code 
is automatically reduced, though not completely blocked, if hosts have the control system 
installed. Therefore, the overall damage to the machine and the network and thereby our 
society, caused by the malicious code is reduced, and the degree of reduction highly 
depends on the percentage of hosts that adopt the control system in the community. In the 
next chapter, we will discuss the relationship between the propagation scale and the 
percentage of hosts that have the control system installed, using some mathematical 
models.
4.5.3 The Limitation of the Control System
One limitation of the control system is that it cannot detect malicious code that 
does not propagate through Internet connections. For example, some malicious code may 
propagate through e-mail, usually as e-mail attachment. The machine gets infected when 
people open the attachment. The malicious code will scan the address list of the victim 
and sends e-mails with the same malicious attachment to everybody in the address list 
automatically. In this case, we can define the normal behavior as the traffic size or the 
number of e-mails sent/received by a machine in a certain period of time. The same 
framework can be applied to build and train the control system. The only difference is 
that the monitored behavior is not the number of connection requests but the number o f e- 
mails sent/received in a given period of time. Similarly, we can extend the control system 
and apply it to monitor the behavior of the server system. The important thing is that we
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need to define the normal behavior that can differentiate the normal and abnormal status 
of a system.
Another limitation is that the network performance relies on the portion of 
machines with control system. The performance improvement evaluated by infection 
delay does not have a linear relationship with the portion of machines with control 
system. In fact, the control system has little effect if  only a few machines of the whole 
network are using it.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presented the development of the control system using Process 
Control technique. We checked the normality assumption of the real data and generated 
the simulation data with the same characteristics o f that of the real data. Then, we showed 
the training and the testing process of the control system. The test results showed that the 
control system achieved zero false negative rate and less than 6% false positive rate when 
we used the optimal tuning parameters. Therefore, the control system is reliable in 
detecting the propagation of malicious mobile code. We also discussed the detection 
delay, the advantages and limitations of the control system. The uniqueness of this 
approach includes:
• It is novel to apply the Process Control theory in the early detection of 
malicious mobile code propagation.
• The addition of a sliding window to the traditional Process Control algorithm 
is very aboriginal, and this makes the system adaptive to the changes of the 
connection behavior.
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• The hypothesis test underlying the monitoring period gives a statistical
explanation and quantitative measurement of the detection accuracy.
• The Sequential Probability Ratio Test ensures the quality o f the detection
system.
• The mathematical models validate the efficiency of the control system in a
network environment.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
This dissertation discusses propagation modeling of malicious mobile code, and 
proposes a control system to detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious code 
automatically. The goals of our work are: (1) Propagation evaluation and prediction of 
malicious code using stochastic models; (2) Early detection and propagation mitigation of 
malicious code. We have been successful in achieving the goals since the simulation 
results match the theoretical results from the propagation models, and the control system 
we proposed detects the propagation of malicious code with zero false negative rate and 
less than 6% false positive rate.
Chapter 1 is an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 introduces the 
backgrounds and related research.
Chapter 3 presents stochastic propagation modeling of malicious mobile code. We 
build a propagation model, INIM model, considering passive immunization from both 
healthy machines and infected machines. Probability generation function technique is 
used to get the explicit solution of the stochastic propagation models. The propagation 
results from the solution match the simulation results, which implies that it is reliable to 
use the propagation model to evaluate and predict the propagation of a malicious mobile
101
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code. To detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious mobile code automatically, we 
propose a control system using statistical process control techniques in Chapter 4. We 
extend the traditional process control by adding a sliding window so that the changes of 
process mean will not affect the detection result. We present the general steps of building 
a control system and give a statistical analysis of the control system. We also present the 
details of data collection, assumption checking, training, and testing. The simulation data 
we used in training and testing are generated based on the real data we have. In the 
simulation experiments, we discuss the effects of tuning parameters like the size of the 
sliding window and the updating frequency. The testing results are satisfying and the 
false positive rate is reduced from more than 30% to less than 6% when the sliding 
window is applied. We also used sequential probability ratio test to control the false 
positive rate so that it will never exceed the threshold. Network performance analysis 
shows that the relationship between propagation mitigation effect and the portion of 
machines applied control system is not linear. Experiments show that if  less than 30% of 
the machines in a network applied the control system, the effect is negligible, but if  more 
than 90% of the machines applied control system, the propagation delay is significant, 
which gained us precious time to fight for it.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Network Immunization
Malicious computer mobile codes have been considered as a form of artificial life 
[Spafford 1994] [Thimbleby 1998] since (1) it exists in space and time; (2) it has the 
characteristic self-reproduction; (3) information is stored when malicious mobile code 
replicates itself; (4) it interacts with the environment and damages are caused by these
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interactions; (5) it has interdependent parts as live organism has; and (6) it mutates.
People also argue that malicious mobile code has a kind of metabolism because it takes
electrical energy to disseminate its patterns of instructions and infect other systems
[Spafford 1994]. Biologically inspired immune systems are developed for computer
systems [Forrest 1997] [Harmer 2002] [D'haeseleer 1996] [Kephart 1994]. These immune
systems profile the normal activities of a machine as self and detect intrusions as non-self.
Immune systems proposed in [Forrest 1997] [Harmer 2002] [D'haeseleer 1996] [Kephart
1994] are basically intrusion detection systems using misuse detection method. The
immunization we discuss in this chapter is different from the immune systems. The
immunization of malicious mobile code is more like the immunization of epidemic
diseases of human beings.
Immunization has been very successful in controlling epidemic diseases of human
beings. Small pox, the disease that originated the research of epidemic modeling, has
been eradicated since vaccination is available to everyone. This chapter defines two
immunization strategy terms for immunization of malicious mobile code. One is called
passive immunization; the other is called active immunization. Propagation models of
malicious mobile code considering the effect of passive immunization and active
immunization are presented, respectively. In active immunization, we present the idea of
using beneficial mobile code to fight against malicious code.
5.2.1.1 Propagation modeling with 
passive immunization
When an active malicious code is found propagating along the network system, a 
security expert will analyze its signature. The way to remove the malicious and fix the
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system will be released to the public once it is available. Users whose machines have 
been infected will take action to immunize the machine.
Definition: An immunization is called passive immunization if  the immunization action 
is taken by human beings.
We divide the lifetime of a malicious code T into two stages. Stage one (Tx) is the 
period during which the immunization of certain malicious code is not available. Stage 
two (T2 ) is the period during which the immunization method has been announced. The 
propagation models we presented in Network Performance Analysis of Chapter 4 
describe the propagation of malicious code in Tx. Here, we present the propagation model 
in T2.
Suppose the immunization rate of infected machine is y . Following the same 
notations given in previous chapters, in a homogeneous network, the deterministic 




= -0 S (t)I(t)
_  5.1




S(t) + I(t) + M (t) = N
with initial conditions S(0) = N - I 0, 7(0) = / 0, and M (0) = 0 ; tl is the moment that
immunization method is available.
Usually, when a computer system is infected, the user of that system may tell this 
to his/her friends. Also, people may get the message from the media or the Internet. The 
warning message about the malicious code will be disseminated, and people may take
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action to prevent the machine from getting infected. Therefore, healthy machines could 
also be immunized. The warning message traverses through the social network of human 
beings. The network topology has little effect on passive immunization rate since the 
spread of warning message does not go through the computer network. Chapter 3 gives 
the model which considers passive immunization from both healthy and infected 
machines. The model we present below considers the control system we proposed in 
Chapter 4.
Let a  denote the immunization rate of a healthy machine and y  denote the 
immunization rate of the infected machine. Suppose p  percent of the machines in our 
network installed the control system, and the average number of neighbors a machine has 
is B, then the propagation model of the malicious code is given as
dS^  = - aS(t) -  / XJ3BX ^  -  I 2(3B
dt w  w 1 N  2 2 N
dt ' ' N  L * N  w  t> t ,
^ j p -  = ctS(t)+jf(t)
S(t)+ l(t) + M (t)= N
with initial conditions ,5(0) = N - I 0, 1(0) = / 0, M (0) = 0. I x, / 2, Bx and B2follow the
same notations we gave in Chapter 4.
5.2.1.2 Propagation modeling with 
active immunization
Mobile programs are also called self-replicating programs because it has a self- 
reproducing mechanism. Self-replicating mobile codes are considered to be malicious by 
most people since the earliest and most prevalent self-replicating mobile program is 
malicious. However a self-replicating mobile program does not have to be malicious; it
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can be designed to be beneficial [Chen 2004] [Eugster 2004] [Thimbleby 1999] 
[Bontchev 1994]. For example, mobile 'code can be designed to travel from machine to 
machine and do useful work in a distributed environment [Levis 2002] [Eugster 2004]; 
mobile code can be used to fight against the malicious programs [Bontchev 1994]. The 
designed network should favor the dissemination of benign mobile code but throttle the 
spread of malicious mobile code. If a beneficial mobile code that is designed to fight 
against the malicious one spreads faster than the malicious one, the overall network 
system will become less vulnerable.
Definition: An immunization is called active immunization if the immunization action is 
automatically taken by benign mobile code.
Suppose a benign mobile code immunizes the healthy machines with rate a  and 
the infected machines with rate y . In a homogeneous network, the propagation model of 
the malicious code becomes
= -j3S(t)I(t) -  aS(t)M(t)
dt
dt t > tr 5.3
= aS(t)M (t)+yI(t)M (t)
dt
S(t) + I(t) + M (t) = N
with S(0) = N - I 0, 7(0) = 70, M(0) = 0 , and M (t1) = M 0; M(t) still denotes the number
of machines that has been immunized. The big difference between these immunized 
machines and the ones in previous models are that these immunized machines 
automatically disseminate a copy of the benign mobile code to its neighbors so that the 
neighbors of this machine could also be immunized.
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Suppose the average number of neighbors a machine has is B, and the benign 
mobile code propagates through exactly the same network as the malicious one does. In 
the network that p  percent of the machines applied the control system, then the 
propagation model of malicious mobile code is
= ^  - I 2J3B2 ^
= I l/3Bl ^  + I 2j3B2^ - - y B  
■ dt N  2 2 N
=  c c B ^ M ( t ) +  y B ^ M ( t )  
dt N  N
S(t)+ l(t)+ M (t)= N  
with 5(0) = N  — I 0, 1(0) = I 0, M ( 0) = 0 , M (tl ) = M 0
The idea of using benign mobile code to fight against the malicious code has been 
implemented in current commercial anti-virus tools. When fixing method of a malicious 
code is available, the anti-virus companies will automatically update its users’ virus 
definition database. But the anti-virus companies will do this only if  people pay them. 
Furthermore, a user’s machine cannot disseminate the updating to other machines.
5.2.1.3 Simulation
The immunization simulation is an extension of the propagation simulation with 
the control system. An immunization procedure is added to the simulation program we 
used in Chapter 4. Each time we run the simulation, when t is less than /,, it follows 
exactly the same infection evolution we have done in Chapter 4; when t is larger than tx, 
which means immunization method becomes available, both infection and immunization 
procedures are running and they are running independently. In the simulation, we assume 
the immunization method is available when t -  15. A node cannot be infected if it has
m
N
M i f )
t > t 5.4
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been immunized. The simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of the immunization 
strategies. Each result is obtained by running the simulation 10 times based on the same 
random network with 5,000 nodes.
Simulation of Passive Immunization
In passive immunization, the immunization procedure randomly immunizes the 
infected node with rate gamma, and the healthy node with rate alpha. It is more likely that 
an infected machine becomes immunized because a user with an infected machine is 
more likely to seek out available methods to fix the problem. In the simulation, we set 
alpha = 0.01, and gamma = 0.1. Figure 5.1 shows the infection evolution of propagation 
model given by Equation 5.2 in which the effect of passive immunization is modeled.




Figure 5.1: Infection evolution with passive immunization 
(TV = 5000, a  = 0.01, y  = 0.1, p  = 0.8, tx = 15).
Simulation of Active Immunization
In active immunization, it is easier for a benign mobile code to immunize a
healthy machine than an infected machine because for a healthy machine, the benign
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program just needs to fix the flaw that has been exploited by the certain malicious code, 
while for an infected machine, it has to remove the malicious program as an additional 
work. Therefore, we set alpha = 0.1, and gamma = 0.05 in the simulation. Figure 6.2 
shows the infection evolution of model given by Equation 5.4 in which the effect of 
active immunization is modeled. Comparing Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.1, we can see active 
immunization is slower than passive immunization at the beginning, but once there are 
have enough “good” seeds in the network, the machines are immunized at a dramatic 
speed. After 50 time units, almost all machines are immunized if active immunization 
applied, and only one third are immunized if  passive immunization applied. Overall, 
active immunization has better performance. However, the implementation of such 
benign mobile code is not easy. If not properly designed, the benign mobile code may 
bring another disaster.
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Figure 5.2: Infection evolution with active immunization 
(N = 5000, a  = 0.1, y = 0.05, p  = 0.8, = 15).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
110
5.2.2 Passive Immunization and 
Network Topology
The immunization strategies we used to prevent infectious diseases for human 
beings include:
• Random immunization.
• Target immunization, for example, immunization by group.
We could have similar strategies when we apply passive immunization to malicious 
mobile code. The immunization we discuss in Section 5.2.1 is purely random, and we 
have no idea who will and who will not immunize the machine. In the future, we could 
have the security experts apply passive immunization according to the priority of the 
machines. For example, we immunize the Internet routers or network backbones first, 
then we immunize the nodes with a higher number of neighbors. The information of 
network topology helps us to decide the target nodes with more than an average number 
of neighbors. We should analyze the effect of random immunization and target 
immunization under network topologies so that we can apply the optimal immunization 
strategy for a network with certain topology.
5.2.3 Active Immunization and 
Network Topology
If we use a graph to represent a subnet in which malicious code traverse, we get a 
graph whose nodes are machines infected by the malicious code, and the lines between 
nodes are the ways malicious code propagate. The propagation model we give as 
Equation 5.4 assumes that benign mobile code propagates through the same subnet a 
malicious one does. In reality, these two may not propagate through the same subnet. 
Also the spreading rate of benign mobile code must be higher than the malicious one to
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prevent the outbreak of malicious code. Previous research has shown that the topology of
underlying subnet affects the spread of mobile code dramatically [Chen04]. We will do
more research on how topology affects the propagation speed of mobile code. In the
future, we will build propagation models that could catch the effect of topology and
design networks that makes a benign mobile code spread faster.
5.2.4 Distributed Malicious Mobile 
Code Detection
The control system we propose in this dissertation is host based. The effect of 
propagation mitigation is not good if  the number of machines in a network that applied 
the control system is small. It takes much time and effort to make sure that every machine 
in the network applied the control system properly. A better way to achieve the same 
effect is to build a control center. Monitors are distributed in the network and each 
monitor reports to the control center periodically. When a host is identified with 
abnormal behavior, its outgoing Internet connections will be limited. At the same time, 
the control center will send a message to other machines in the network. We do not want 
to disable the function of the whole network. One way to defend against the possible 
malicious code is choosing some nodes in the network and limiting the outgoing 
connection of these nodes so that the propagation of malicious code will be slowed down. 
More research needs to be done on how to decide the number of nodes we should choose, 
and the policy of choosing specific nodes so that the propagation could be slowed down 
maximally with minimum effect on the normal function of the network.
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